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Abstract 
The South African Council of Churches (SACC) played an extremely crucial role during 
the struggle against apatiheid. The role of the SACC was first and foremost to provide a 
voice for the voiceless. It managed, among other tasks, to actively fill the void left by 
movements banned by the illegitimate apartheid government. As a result of its fight 
against the inequalities that existed in South Africa, its work adopted a political character. 
In the aftermath of post-apartheid South Africa, the SACC was left with the task of 
redefining its role within South African society and civil society, specifically. The 
euphoric sentiment in the mid-1990s was in part reflected in the SACCo However, the 
conclusion reached by the Council in 1995 was that it would also playa role of 'critical 
solidarity' which essentially meant that it would not shy away from attacking the 
government when the need arose. 
Since 1994, the South African government has implemented a number of policies that do 
not appear to be in the immediate interest of the majority of South African citizens atld 
have brought church and state into conflict. This thesis attempts to tackle three issues 
which are pertinent to the South African situation and which shed light on state-civil 
society interactions. These issues are HIV I Aids, the question of odious debt and the 
Zimbabwe crisis. By using both primary and secondary sources, the SACC's responses 
to govemment's handling of these matters will be compared with the responses of the 
South African Catholic Bishops Conference in order to determine their relationships with 
govenunent. 
The conclusion of this investigation is that the SACC has in fact managed to maintain a 
position of critical solidarity. It has been faced with numerous challenges with regard to 
maintaining the fragile boundary of alliance with government on the one hand, and 
becoming atlti-government on the other. However, by forming alliances with other civil 
society actors as well as fostering a relationship with govemment in order (0 facilitate 
mediation this dissertation argues that the SACC has become an essential member of 
South Africa's vibrant civil society. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Gellner (1995: 32) has defined civil society as 
that set of diverse non-govemmental institutions, which is strong enough to 
counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its 
role as keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can 
neveltheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society. 
Civil society has generally come to be seen as important for democracy because it 
mediates between the state on the one hand and the mass of the populace on the other 
(Gill, 200: 6-7). According to Salvador Giner (1995: 302) 
Liberal democracy (encompassing not only political representation and 
participation, privacy and autonomy of association and private institutions, but 
also the free formation of all sorts of movements and parties, whether socialist, 
liberal , conservative, feminist, environmentalist, or any other kind) has been 
closely tied to civil society through out modem history. 
Civi l society is regarded as critical for democracy in developing countries (Nkhulu, 1993; 
Glaser, 1997; Kasfir, 1998; Zuem, 2000). According to Gill (2000: 7) 'it is through civil 
society and its institutions, including political parties and voluntary groups and 
associations, that the network of popular participation and activism, which is the heart of 
any notion of what democracy means, is established'. Liebenberg (2000: 70) shares these 
sentiments and argues that' ... the role of one of the building blocks of a democracy, the 
civil community or civil society, is of extreme importance'. This is particularly relevant 
for post-apaltheid South Africa. Civil society, many argue, can represent the interests of 
the marginalized (Nkhulu, 1993: 7). Swilling (cited in Nkulu , 1993: 2-3) sees civil 
society as 
one where ordinary everyday citizens who do not control the levers of political 
and economic power, have access to locally constituted voluntary associations 
that have the capacity to influence and even detemline the structures of power and 
the allocation of material resources 
Civil society and its institutions, which include political parties and voluntary 
associations, allow for the existence of popular participation and activism which is 
important for democracy to succeed (Gill, 2000: 7). These approaches to civil society 
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appear to argue that civil society and the state are two separate entities. However, this is 
not the case as civi l society cannot claim to exist if it is not situated within the space that 
is essentially provided by the state. According to Young (1994: 44) 'the very notion of 
civil society loses its meaning if severed from the state'. Civi l society and the state 
therefore mutually reinforce one another. Thus, without the state there can be no civil 
society as civil society often develops in response to and in some instances in opposition 
to the state. Young (1994: 45) furthe r argues that civil society's opposition to the state is 
not 'to its territorial framework but to its hegemonical project'. The intent of civil society 
is not to take over the role of the state but to challenge the state when it does not serve the 
interest of the elected. The area of civil society is regarded as the necessary middle 
ground or the space between those in government and the people that they rule. If one 
were to accept these definitions, the implication is that the civil society-state interface 
allows for issues to be 'thrashed out' in order to find solutions that would benefit all. 
However, for a deeper understanding of civil society, it is necessary to look at the 
historical roots of the concept. It was not always seen as separate from the state. John 
Locke made no separation between the state and civil society. Locke saw it as essentially 
constituting the idea of a limited government, which allows for the protection of civil ian 
rights (de Lue, 1997: 136-137). He argued that a civi l society is created when citi zens 
give consent and enter into a contract with government to protect their rights . According 
to Locke (cited in Young, 1994: 33) 
Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every 
one his executive power of the law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there 
and there only is a political or civil society 
Thus, the concepts of civil and political society were initially used interchangeably and 
there was no separation between the political and the civil arenas. 
Hegel was one of the first theorists to make a distinction between political and civi l 
society, by defining the latter as the space between the state and the family. He did not 
regard civil society as antagonistic to the state and the space created by civil society was 
therefore not the arena for criticism or antagonism. Instead Hegel viewed it as the field in 
which debate could take place and mutual agreement could be reached regarding issues 
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which impact on human rights but with the state as a much higher fonn of rationality than 
society (Khilnani, 2001: 23-24). Hegel believed that there existed a reciprocal 
relationship between civil society and the state and that civil society was the sphere of 
recognition for modern liberal individual freedoms (Khilnani, 2001: 23-24). According 
to Harbeson (1994: 19-20) the Hegelian notion of the state and civil society exists in a 
symbiotic relationship. For Hegel one could not exist without the other and civil society 
in particular was governed by the rules of the state as it was not inherently 'civil' and 
therefore had to be subjected to the higher political will of the state (Bratton, 1994: 54). 
Thus, civil society, in Hegel's view, depended on the state for its existence. 
But civil society has been an extremely contested subject for several reasons. First, some 
normative theorists insist that civil society should not be too powerful, although it should 
be robust. It is suggested that civil society should limit itself to an 'intennediary, 
regulatory' role in the relationship between govemment and its citizens. Civil society 
does therefore not exist to take over the role of the state but to create a space for debate 
and increased participation of citizens. Kasfir (1998: 1) for example, sees civil society as 
an instrument to make African states more democratic, more transparent and more 
accountable. De Lue (1997: 13) suggests that it 'acts as a buffer against the power of 
central government' and it is a 'space' in which individuals or citizens of a state are able 
to enjoy their rights without violation from either the state or any other person (de Lue, 
1997: 136). Gill (2000: 7) argues that 'it is through civil society and its institutions, 
including political patiies and voluntary groups and associations, that the network of 
popular participation and activism, which is the heart of any notion of what democracy 
means, is established' . A 'robust' civil society is seen as an important factor in 
improving and stimulating political participation (Diamond, 1994: 7), but these 
definitions suggest that civil society is self-limiting. 
Second, a more expansive definitions offered by Bayart (1986: Ill) argues that civil 
society only exists to the extent that it is 'in confrontation with the state'. It is 'the 
process by which society seeks to "breach" and counteract the simultaneous "totalisation" 
unleashed by the state. In some instances civil society may go beyond a 'watchdog' role 
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but may consequently contribute to the overthrow of authoritarian and undemocratic 
regimes. Of importance in Bayali's definition is the fact that he acknowledges civil 
society's integral relationship with government and that one does not exist without the 
other. His definition of civil society is however limiting as it does not make provision for 
a civil society that is not essentially antagonistic toward government. It assumes that 
civil society loses its place or value when it does not actively oppose government. Kasfir 
(1998) and Zuern (2000) have suggested that civil society has a dual role as in celiain 
instances it would work to undermine government while in others it would support newly 
democratic regimes. 
Third, the concept of civil society IS contested because its origins lie in a Weste11l 
philosophical tradition and has therefore often been defined in a way that does not allow 
it to be used in an 'African' sense as it does not take into consideration the history and 
experiences of communities in the Third World. (Young, 1994). Nevertheless, it has 
been hailed by many theorists as the key to understanding democratic transitions and 
change around the world (Diamond, 1994; Glaser: 1997; Kasfir: 1998; Liebenberg: 
2000). Ciyil society, most agree, has generally been an important dimension of 
democracy and democratization because it mediates between the incumbent regime and 
its electorates (Gill, 2000: 6-7). 
FOlllih, traditional definitions and notions of civil society do not include religious 
organizations. Zuern (2000: 109) argues that 'while ethnic and village based groupings 
are normally excluded in Weste11l definitions of civil society, the African case and all -
countries outside the advanced industrialized states, beg the question of whether this is 
appropriate ' . Because of the differing historical context that Africa finds itself in, it is 
necessary to include other social, cultural, political and economic groupings which are 
inherent to the African context. Religious organizations appear to have all the necessary 
characteristics believed by Camerer (cited in Liebenberg. 2000: 71) to define civil 
society. According to Camerer (Liebenberg, 2000: 71) civil society organizations are 
communally organized, independent, voluntary, autonomous, able to form links with 
other interest groups and do not in any way seek to set themselves up as an alte11lative 
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authority to the state'. In South Afri ca (and also within the broader African context) 
churches have been integral members of civil society. Patrick Molutsi (2003: 168) 
suggest that religious groups, together with human rights groups, closely follow media 
and women's groups as the strongest organs of civil society in the Southern African 
regIon. 
In Africa, the concept of civil society is fraught with difficulties. Zuern (2000: 107) 
cautions that African states need to be dealt with taking unique circumstances into 
account, given that the past experiences of African countries are 'qualitatively different 
from European states'. Gorus (cited in Liebenberg, 2000: 73) similarly argues that 'we 
are faced with the need to remodel sustainable democracy in the African context' One of 
the major issues is the fact that civil society has more of a dual role in African settings 
than most definitions imply. Often 'civil ' society in Africa has had to be far more 
antagonistic towards the state. Its primary purpose is to ensure that the socio-economic 
needs of the populace are advanced. Once thi s happens, however, civil society is often in 
a di lemma for it may have to pose fundamental questions about policy choices and 
international alignments of a given state. Another tension also arises according to Zuern 
(2000: 105) after democratic transitions. Civil society has to move from the role of street 
protester to proactive policy maker, but ' this is hardly realistic'. A number of civic 
movements have the very challenging task of remaining the voice of the people whi le 
their former allies in the liberation struggle are now in power. 
As has been extensively documented, the civic movement, in South Africa was vital in 
ending apartheid. One of the key players was the South African Counci l of Churches. It 
perfonned a crucial role during the liberation struggle following the banning of mainline 
political movements in the 1960 's (Nel, 1994: 142). Despite numerous attempts by the 
apartheid government to shut down the SACC, it was the one part of civil society that the 
state could not effectively repress (Phiri, 2001: 114). 
With the end of official apartheid in 1994, an end to the old role that the SACC played 
seemed inevitable. Churches had fulfilled their immediate mission to bring an end to 
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apaIiheid aIld the unbanned political movements took over the role of providing a voice 
to the people (Phiri, 2001: 124). In 1995 the SACC, in association with the World 
Council of Churches, held a conference where it questioned the place of the ecumenical 
movement in post-apartheid South Africa. According to Charles Villa-Vicencio aIld 
Wolfi'am Kistner (Bam, 1995: 50) the challenge to the church was to provide a position 
of 'critical solidarity'. 
The current govemment, some argue (Bond, 2003 ; Jubilee South Africa, 2001; TAC, 
2002; Ngwane, 2002), has not always been sufficiently responsive on issues like 
HIV I Aids, apartheid debt and reparations. Many policies instituted by govemment 
seemed to be more concemed with improving the minority interests of the new goveming 
class and the old economic elites instead of concentrating on development and the 
upliftment of the poor in South Africa. The apparent failure to adequately address issues 
like debt and HIV/Aids directly affects the lives of the marginalized. Studies have shown 
that the HIV/A ids epidemic in South Africa has led to the death of millions of South 
Africa 's working population and this could have devastating effects for society as well as 
for the economy. Unti l very recently seemingly little has been done by the state to 
address this issue. 
It is not only the Aids dilemma that has sparked controversy. Govemment has also had a 
somewhat antagonistic relationship with the Jubilee debt campaigners. Though the 
majority of South African citizens continue to live in abject poverty, government has 
continued to service debts which were incurred by the previous regime. As a result South 
Africans continue to suffer as govemment has to spend a large percentage of its budget 
on debt servicing. Thus resources that should be used on social spending, the health 
sector in particular, are being used to further enrich the West, argues Jubilee. Another 
thom in South Africa's side is the Mugabe govemment's continued disregard for human 
rights and the devastating impact that his policies are having not only on Zimbabwe but 
also the entire region. 
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This study will examine the state-civil society nexus by exploring three issues pertinent 
to South Afi-icans and the Southern African region_ The thesis will thus attempt to 
interrogate how the concept of critical solidarity is operationalised within the state-civi l 
society relationship_ This will be done by comparing the role of the SACC, from 1998-
2002, with that of the South African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) on three 
issues (HIV -Aids, debt and Zimbabwe).] Both primary and secondary sources will be 
used in order to assess the involvement of the SACC and SACBC? Primary sources 
include statements from both the SACC and SACBC as well as newspaper articles, 
speeches and official documents while the secondary resources refer to academic 
literature. In every chapter the interaction that has taken place between government and 
the SACC and SACBC will be analysed and compared in order to determine whether one 
has been more aggressive than the other in exerting pressure on government to change or 
re-evaluate its policies. 
The first goal of this thesis is to investigate the role of the SACC in representing socially 
and politically marginalized groups to the state. The involvement of the SACC will be 
assessed within its paradigm -- the SACC 's idea of critical solidarity. 
Comparing the views of the SACC and SACBC on three issues, will allow me to situate 
the SACC within one of three positions; a close alliance with the government, occupying 
the middle ground and a third option; outright opposition to the government. 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter Two looks at the HIV/ Aids dilemma in South Africa and how the SACC has 
been involved in lobbying government to uphold the human rights of people who are 
I The SACBC has been a full member of the SACC since 1995 and prior to this they enjoyed observer 
member starus (wl;vw.sacbc.org.za/ecume.htm). Though this thesis will compare the actions of the two 
organisations this fact has been kept in mind. In many ways the SACBC still functions differently from the 
SACC and though they are a member of the council they have a large amount of capacity and resources to 
perform on their own. Another important factor is that the policies of the SACBC are informed by the 
Vatican. 
2 In some instances the thesis will make use of Council to refer to the SACC and Conference to refer to the 
SACBC. 
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affected by this disease. The argument of this chapter is that the SACC has been 
'wholly' antagonistic towards government HIV policies. The SACC has, despite its 
belated joining of the campaign, been militant in its opposition .. Its movement character 
was further strengthened by the fact that it fonned alliances with other civil society actors 
which were willing to undertake mass action of a sometimes 'illegal' character to 
challenge government. 
Chapter Three deals with the Jubilee debt coalition of which the SACC was a founding 
member. The primary aim of the coalition was to have South Africa's debt written off 
since it was regarded as 'odious and illegitimate' because it was incurred by the apartheid 
government. The SACC continues to support this campaign but its relationship with 
the Jubilee leadership since 2003 has been tense. This stems from the fact that after 
repeated calls for government to become involved with the debt and reparations 
campaign, it only did so after legal proceedings were instituted against foreign 
businesses. The SACC officially supported government's attempts at mediation and 
urged all involved (government, civil society and business) to pat1ake in efforts to find a 
suitable solution. This position led to the SACC being accused of aligning itself with 
government at the expense of civil society. Some within the Jubilee movement (Giyose, 
2004) have suggested that the SACC has in this instance allowed itself to be caught in a 
compromising situation which has led others within civil society to question its 
allegiance. Though it has made valid arguments for mediation, it has also become 
alienated from its allies in Jubilee. The Council has not been very sensitive to the 
consequence of its actions and it appears that it could have found a more effective way to 
deal with both government and civi I society. 
Chapter Four of the thesis addresses the situation in Zimbabwe over the last three years. 
The SACC as well as the SACBC have received numerous requests from their 
Zimbabwean counterparts to lobby the Mbeki government to do something to stop the 
lawlessness in the country. Despite repeated lobbying from South African civil society, 
including the SACBC and SACC and more recently COSA TU, the South African 
government has maintained its policy of 'quiet diplomacy' despite a lack of success. The 
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chapter seeks to establish what the roles of the SACC and SACBC have been in lobbying 
government with regard to finding a solution. In the past few years Zimbabwe has 
become progressively worse and the situation in that country is having profound effects 
on South Africa as well as on the entire region. Despite its initial support for 
government's 'quiet diplomacy' the SACC has recently protested against the handling of 
the situation and has joined other civil society movements to lobby the Mbeki 
government to commit itself to more assertive and aggressive action towards Zimbabwe. 
Together with the SACBC and other civil society organizations it has shown its lack of 
faith in government's stance by instituting its own attempts at mediation and arbitration 
in Zimbabwe. This however, has been less than successful but the failure to make any 
inroads has not deterred either the Councilor Bishops Conference which are both 
actively opposed to the South African government's policy and lack of action. 
Finally Chapter Five concludes by arguing that the SACC and SACBC have both been 
very active in South African society in the last six years. Both organizations had the 
major task of having to redefine their roles within the changing South African context 
which existed after the 1994 democratic elections. Not only did the new government 
have to deal with the vast legacy of poveliy and inequality left to it by the apartheid 
regime but it was also suddenly confronted by a whole new range of problems that were 
affecting the country. The entire climate after 1994 was one of uncertainty in which 
former allies suddenly found themselves on opposite sides. For the SACC this was 
certainly the case and for this reason its is perhaps understandable that it finds itself in the 
predicament in which it has to define its relationship with government in a way that does 
not suggest that it has become too closely allied and thus a puppet of those in power. For 
the SACBC this was not much of an issue. The Catholic Church chose not to get too 
involved in the anti apartheid struggle and as a result it did not find itself in the same 
situation as the SACC and this has allowed it to be (in some instances) more objective 
and critical of government when necessary. Despite its predicament, however, the SACC 
has to a large extent managed to fulfil its role of 'critical solidarity'. This has been 
difficult in some instances but for the most part the Council has not allowed itself to be 
coerced or co-opted by government. 
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Chapter 2 
The SACC and SACBC response to the South African 
Government's HIV/Aids policies 
Introduction 
The scale of the HIY/Aids pandemic has made it the worst in modem times. In Sub-
Saharan Africa alone by 2003 an estimated 25 million people had been infected with HIY 
while about 2.2 million deaths were recorded in the region. Since 1981 HIV/Aids has 
claimed more than 20 million lives worldwide (UNAids, 2004). South Africa was the last 
African country to be affected by HIY I Aids. According to estimates, in 1998, India was 
the only country with a higher number of HIV/Aids infections than South Africa 
(Kinghorn and Steinberg, 1998: 3). 
Already in 2002, 5.3 million South Africans were infected, up from an estimated 4.74 
million in 2001 (Department of Health, 2003). According to statistics by the Actuarial 
Society of South Africa (ASSA) an estimated 6.5 million South Africans live with the 
disease (Dorrington et aI, 2002: 4). Of the 6.5 million about 6.1 million were between 18 
and 64. More women than men are infected with women of child-bearing age accounting 
for almost 50% of infections. In the 15-24 age group, for everyone male that is infected, 
there are four females who are HIV positive (Dorrington et aI, 2002: 4). According to 
ASSA, by the end of 2002, HIY I Aids was responsible for about 40% of all deaths in 
South Africa (Dorrington et aI, 2002: 6). The populations most affected were: 18.4% for 
Africans, 6.6% for Coloureds, 6.2% for Whites and 1.8% among Indians (Chisana, 2002: 
8). Though Aids was initially associated with being a problem in the townships an 
increasing number of White, Coloured and Indian people are becoming infected. A study 
conducted by the Wits University Reproductive Health Research Unit showed that by the 
time they are 23 , a fifth of South African youths between 15 and 24 will be infected. A 
further worrying statistic is that by the age of 22 at least 1 in 4 South African women are 
HIV positive (Ndaki, 2004). 
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The problem has been complicated by stigma and discrimination. Until fairly recently it 
was taboo in many religions to ta lk about sex and sexuality. This reluctance to deal with 
HIV / Aids has been exacerbated by the fact that the virus was commonly associated with 
gay men and sexual promiscuity. Even when the church responded to the HIV / Aids 
epidemic, many claimed that its response was inadequate (SAFAIDS, 2001). It was only 
in 2000 that the religious community in South Africa started to address the devastation of 
HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and the fact that it has affected all ages and 
every sector of the population. Concerted action from religious institutions and 
organizations attempting to curb the spread of this fatal disease started in early 2001 and 
1999 for the South African Counci l of Churches (SACC) and the South African Catholic 
Bishops Conference (SACBC), respectively. Tn the SACC, in the late 1990's HlV/Aids 
was not addressed with any vigour as many saw it as a 'non-issue' (Thompson, interview, 
14 May 2004). In order to address the issue, the church had to come to grips with its 
reluctance to begin to talk about sex and sexuality. 
Because this is currently the biggest challenge faced by South Africa, this chapter will 
firstly look at the SACC's response to the South Afi'ican govemment's handling of the 
HlV/Aids issue. It will thereafter examine the reaction of the South African Catholic 
Bishops Conference (SACBC) to the HTV / Aids policies of govemment. 
SAee response to government 
In this section, I will provide the following: 
1) A content analysis of the interactions between the SACC and the state. 
2) A chronology of the interactions between the SACC and the state. 
Contents of interactions between the SACC and the state 
The SACC's first official response to the HTV epidemic was fonnulated during a regional 
consultation that it hosted together with the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the 
Fellowship of Christian Counci ls in Southem Africa (FOCCISA). The consultation was 
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attended by delegates from ten other Southem African Christian Councils and resulted in 
a pledge made by all present to tackle the issue (WCC, 2001). 
The SACC's commitment to challenging the problem of HIV/Aids was confirmed in 
2001 when it held its National Conference from 14 to 17 August. A resolution passed 
stated that, 
the SACC should, together with other organizations who are involved in lobbying 
the govemment, work to ensure the availability of free anti-retroviral drugs for 
people living with HIV/AIDS, including Nevirapine for all pregnant women and 
their newboms, and the provision of adequate health care for all South Africans 
(SACC, 200Ia) . 
On 30 October 2001, soon after the National Conference, the general secretary, Molefe 
Tsele, addressed a conference of church leaders about the role of the church in South 
Africa. The speech, entitled 'The Church must once again become a nuisance to the 
nation' appealed to the religious community to carryon their mission of providing a 
voice to the poor. Tsele argued that the SACC could not become so close to govemment 
that it could not be critical of the latter's policies. In his opinion 
We (the SACC) must run away from an incestuous cohabitation with govemment. 
To do othelwise would be to neglect our mission as a church. We would cease to 
exist as an autonomous entity (Tsele, 2001). 
Referring to the SACC's alliance with the ANC during the apartheid struggle he stated 
To be in alliance with a persecuted political movement is one thing, but to 
become its ally in govemment is another. The problem for South Africa is that 
govemment tends to see non-support as opposition, and even such opposition is 
interpreted in terms of an "anyone who is not with us is against us" dichotomy 
(Tsele, 2001) 
The government's response to this speech came during the president's birthday greeting 
to the former Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu. After commending Bishop 
Tutu on devoting his life to the liberation struggle, President Mbeki implied that the 
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churches today were confused about their role and that they had lost sight of erad icating 
the legacies ofapaliheid. According to Mbeki (2001)3, 
Rightly or wrongly, the perception emerged that the religious communities had 
come to the conclusion that the end of white minority rule had also brought an 
end to their own obligation to be involved in the continuing stmggle to address 
the terrible legacy of the political and social system against which they had 
stmggled. 
Despite the fact that the SACC had indeed been going through an identity crisis, it was 
clear that the Council would not become a puppet of government. Instead the SACC's 
intention was to remain an active member of civil society. 
The SACC released a 27 November 200 I statement calling for public programmes to 
prevent mother-to-chi ld-transmission (MTCT). Significantly, the call coincided with the 
decision of the Treatment Action Campaign (T AC) to institute legal action against the 
South African government to provide Nevirapine to HIV positive pregnant women. The 
SACC made it clear in this November 2001 statement that it was in support of TAC's 
proposed plan of action as this was the last resort in getting government to prevent 
MTCT 
We regret that it has been necessary for TAC to resoli to litigation to compel 
government action. We believe strongly that both plaintiff and respondent in this 
case share a genuine concern for the lives and health of people living with 
HIV/AIDS, especially those whose treatment options are severely constrained by 
poverty' (SACC, 200Ic). 
According to the statement 
TAC's suit (law suit) seeks to achieve two objectives. First, it aims to ensure that 
every woman with HIV who gives birth usi ng public health facilities has 
immediate access to Nevirap ine if her attending doctor or nurse recommends such 
treatment to minimise the risks of transmitting the vims to her child. Second, the 
3 It is ironic that the president chose to praise Archbishop Tutu for his courage and faith during the struggle 
while at the same time separating him from those who are critical of government. This relationship has 
soured since the Archbishop criticized government for its lack of action with regard to black economic 
empowerment, HIY/Aids and the Zimbabwe question (Independent Oll/ille, 29 November 2004). Mbeki 
launched a scathing attack on Tutu and accused him of making gratuitous insults and suggested that the 
Archbishop should not be making certain claims concerning the decision making that happens within the 
ANC as he is not a member of the party (ANC Today, 26 November 2004). It is interesting to note that 
Mbeki, in his reply to Tutti' s criticism, addressed all the concerns raised by Archbishop Tutu with the 
exception of arguably lhe most important issue: HIY/Aids. He declined to make any comment on the 
government's HIY/Aids policy. 
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action hopes to require the state to introduce in a timely fashion a national 
programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The SACC endorses 
both of these goals (SACC, 200 I c). 
The subsequent ruling of the High Court was in favour of T AC and forced government to 
provide anti retrovirals (ARY's) to HIY positive pregnant mothers. This was a welcome 
change and victory for those who have been fighting to save the lives of HIY positive 
mothers and their unborn chi ldren. 
At an interfaith workshop held in Durban on 5 March 2002, the Minister of Health, Dr. 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, pledged to consolidate the partnership between govemment 
and faith based organisations (FBO' s). According to the minister, the importance of 
churches was recognized and the religious community had a central role to play in the 
implementation of the five year HIY/Aids Strategic Plan for South Africa that was 
introduced in 2000 (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2002). FBO's in tum agreed to commit 
themselves to a partnership with government. 
However the progress made during this time was marred by the controversy during 1999 
and 2000, surrounding President Mbeki's apparent questioning of the link between HIV 
and Aids and whether or not HIY causes Aids (Haffajee, 2003). On April 16 2002, the 
SACC released a statement that challenged those in government, who doubted the link 
between HIY and Aids, to concentrate their efforts on finding an adequate solution to the 
problem at hand instead of wasting valuable time, energy and resources that would have 
been better spent addressing a situation that was heading for a major disaster. In the 
statement, the SACC expressed its dismay at Aids 'denialists' in government and said 
that it found it 'ironic that the vacillation, and doubt, comes from within the camp that we 
thought would lead the assault on HlY/Aids ' . According to the SACC it was taking 
A bold stance, and challenged the mighty and powerful in government circles to 
work in partnership with all stakeholders seeking to alleviate the plight of those 
infected and affected by the pandemic (SACC, 2002a). 
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The SACC also criticized the decision, by the Mpumalanga Health Department, to 
terminate the services of Dr. Thys von Mollendorft, calling its actions 'ethically 
indefensible ' (SACC, 2002a). 
On 2 May 2002 the SACC together with TAC, the Archbishop of Cape Town, COSATU 
and other civil society organizations participated in a public march (attended by about 
6000 people) which culminated in the presentation of a memorandum to the Presidential 
Task Team on Aids requesting a meeting to tackle the issue from a civil society 
perspective. This memorandum stalied offby stating civil society's disappointment with 
government and especially Aids denialists 
... it must be emphasized that the views of the HIV/Aids denialists are an insult to 
millions of people living and dying with HN, as well as their friends and 
families. Debating life and death questions that have been settled by science is 
not constructive .. . (TAC, 2002). 
However, the request was also framed as an offer to facilitate interaction between civil 
society and govel11ment 
The T AC and its allies offer our full support to Govel11ment to assist with the 
development of this plan. We are ready, in the words of Cabinet, to join hands to 
combat the I-IIV/Aids epidemic (TAC, 2002). 
The SACC pledged its support to TAC's initiative with the release of a 7 May 2002 
statement in which it blamed the church, broader society and particularly some in 
govel11ment for doing the HIV/Aids cause a 'grave disservice' by concentrating too 
much energy and effort on intemal debates and infighting and this was doing the cause 
more damage than good. It urged all within society to continue the process of de-
stigmatisation as rejection and isolation experienced by Aids sufferers are crucial factors 
which ultimately claim lives (SACC, 2002b). With this in mind, the SACC hosted a 
conference to condemn stigmatization on 12 May 2002. An address given by Deputy 
'Von Mollendorffwas the superintendent ofa Mpumalanga state hospital who had disciplinary 
proceedings brought against him in 2002 after he allowed an NGO to provide emergency ARV treatment to 
people who have survived sexual assault. He was subsequently dismissed by the Mpumalanga MEC for 
Hea lth (Sullday Times, 16 March 2003). 
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President Jacob Zuma once agall1 declared government's commitment to forging a 
strong partnership with FBO's. A hand of partnership and friendship was reached out to 
those within the faith communities and an appeal was made to them to assist government 
in its attempts to overcome and find a solution for this problem (Zuma, 2002). 
On 3 October 2002 the National Executive Committee ofthe SACC released a statement 
that applauded TAC for its actions against government and pharn1aceutical companies 
and calling on them to launch a stronger fight and all out war on Aids. However, in this 
statement it also congratulated government for finally introducing the roll out of 
prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) programmes at some public 
hospitals whi le at the same time urging them to speed up the provision of ARY's to 
others who might have been exposed to the vims for example those who have been 
victims of sexual abuse and rape (SACC, 2002c). 
In 2003 the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NED LAC) 
framework agreement on a National Prevention and Treatment Plan for Combating 
HIY/Aids --- an agreement between Government, Business, Labour and the conm1llnity--
- called for a rollout of a programme to prevent mother-to-child-transmission (MTCT) 
and provision of ARY's to rape victims as well as people living with HIY/Aids. A 
recommendation was made at the start of the proceedings that an agreement be reached 
by the end of that year so that it could be introduced on World Aids Day on 1 December 
2003. However, government stated that it was not able to agree to the document in such 
a short space of time due to certain constraints (NEDLAC framework agreement, 2003). 
President Mbeki was questioned in the media about the controversy surrounding this 
document and his reply was that no agreement had been reached contrary to what had 
been reported. COSATU had called the President's answer 'a wilful dist0I1ion of the 
nature of the Nedlac processes. In response to this government's NEDLAC 
representative, Advocate Rams Ramashia (2003), called COSATU's statement 
'despicable and unjust' and argued that it ' cast aspersion on the credibility and integrity 
of the president'. 
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On 14 February 2003 the SACC joined T AC in another mass march (with more than 15 
000 in attendance) which was intended to appeal to govemment to make a pledge to 
supply ARV's. A memorandum was handed to representatives from the offices of the 
President and Deputy President. However, there was very little response from 
government and the memorandum has gone unanswered (TAC, 2003). The next move 
by the SACC was to hand in a submission to the Portfolio Committee on Social 
Development, 9 June 2003 , which urged the government to seriously consider the 
introduction of a social protection package in the fom1 of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) 
that would benefit those at the bottom end of society and would be particularly useful for 
HIV I Aids sufferers. The BIG would relieve the burden on already over stretched social 
and health depatiments as people would not succumb easily to opportunistic infections 
which are caused by Aids but worsened by poverty stricken conditions. This suggestion 
offers a real solution to many social problems that face the country at1d the view of the 
SACC is that it would improve the lives of many (SACC, 2003b). According to the 
SACC 'a BIG can help to break the vicious cycle of HIV/Aids and poverty and reverse 
the trend of the HIV/Aids crisis in South Africa' (SACC, 200Ic). However, government 
continues to debate the efficacy of a social grant of this magnitude. 
A breakthrough, in South Africa's strategy to fight HIV/Aids, was made during the first 
national Aids conference hosted in Durbat1 during August 2003. In a statement made on 
7 August 2003 , Minister of Health Manto Tshabalala-Msimang reiterated the need for all 
South Africans to 'engage constructively to ensure that the country's response to the 
challenge of HI V and Aids is a success'. She further recognized the importance of Anti-
retrovirals in improving and prolonging the lives of those who live with Aids 
(Tshabalala-Msimang, 2003). The SACC welcomed this statement and in response to 
the minister ' s speech, recommitted itself to assisting govemment during their continuing 
partnership and quest to fight the scourge of Aids (SACC, 2003c). 
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Analysis of content of interactions between the SACC and the state 
In its first commitment to fighting Aids, the SACC stated that it would 'together with 
other organizations who are involved in lobbying the govemment, work to ensure the 
availability of free anti-retroviral drugs for people living with HIV/Aids . .. ' (SACC, 
200Ia). This statement from the SACC National Executive Council is extremely 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, it stated from the outset that it would work with other 
civil society organizations that were lobbying govemment for it to change its policies. 
This meant that it would be aligning itself with organizations and individuals like TAC 
and the Archbishop of Cape Town, Njongonkulu Ndungane, who had been a thorn in 
government's side regarding the latter's policies on HIV/Aids. This automatically placed 
the SACC and govemment on opposing sides. Secondly, the SACC stated that it would 
campaign for the provision of ARV 's to all People living with Aids (PLWA's). Once 
again the Council was aligning itself with those pressurising govemment to provide Aids 
drugs. Thus the SACC was positioning itself in the role of watchdog, ready to challenge 
govemment when it felt that those in power were abandoning the plight of the poor and 
needy. 
This intention was confirmed in Molefe Tsele's speech in which he argued that the role 
of the church is "being in solidarity with those who are vulnerable, who are excluded as a 
result of their social situation- the poor, refugees, the homeless, the unemployed etc." 
(Tsele,2001). According to the SACC general-secretary, "the ANC is no longer simply a 
liberation movement. It is a ruling party, one which sometimes pursues policies and 
actions with which we cannot associate ourselves with an easy conscience . . . " The 
SACC has promised that it would not meekly stand by and support govemment 
regardless of its policies and that it would not be 'appeased by handouts' as its mandate 
came from the people and not the ANC (Tsele, 2001). Judging /Tom the President's reply 
it was clear that he regarded this statement as a challenge and attack on govemment. 
According to Mbeki (200 I) 
The reality however is that as we achieved our common political victory over the 
system of apartheid, the religious faiths in our country that had, in some instances, 
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been engaged in struggle for our liberation for over a century, had some difficulty 
in deternlining what their role would be in the aftermath of this victory. 
Mbeki also accused churches and religious leaders of abandoning the struggle against the 
social injustices created by apa11heid. His criticism stems from the fact that the General 
Secretary had urged religious movements in South Africa to be aware of government's 
faults and shortcomings. During apartheid some churches were fervent allies of the 
liberation movements as they were united in their common goal to overthrow the 
apartheid govermnent. However, since the country has been liberated, it is no longer 
necessary for the religious movement to tum a blind eye to the faults of its fornler allies. 
As an influential member of South African civil society the SACC has acknowledged that 
it has a duty to hold government accountable. The SACC has urged government not to 
lose sight of the goals set after liberation, namely to rebuild the country and to remove 
the legacy of apartheid. Therefore it has voiced its criticism when government has 
implemented policies (both economic and social) that were "anti-poor" and that benefited 
a minority. According to Tsele (2001) "the poor are constantly failed by those who 
should know better". 
The SACC aligned itself with TAC when the latter took government to court and though 
those within the Council regretted that it had to support such extreme action, it could see 
no other alternative. In his speech Molefe Tsele recognized the tension that actions such 
as these would cause between the govemment and the SACCo The Council did not want 
to be seen as anti-government when it was being critical of the state but at the same time 
it did not want to be regarded as pro-government when assisting and supporting those in 
power when they were implementing policies that the SACC favoured (Tsele, 2001). 
The court action was taken because government was not paying heed to the demands 
from civi l society to provide life-saving drugs. In the end, it was up to the court to force 
them to do so. 
The march and handing over of a memorandum was significant for two reasons. Firstly, 
the SACC criticism has not only been verba l and behind closed doors. The SACC and its 
allies have engaged in confrontationist action and civil defiance of the state and its 
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authority, a move that is reminiscent of the anti-apartheid struggle. Secondly, this march 
made it clear that government policies would be challenged when they are not in the 
interests of the marginalised. 
Table 1.1: Chronology of the interactions between the SACC and the 
state 
Date Form of Response Who/What level? 
1. March 2001 First official SACC response. Members from all 
Regional Consultation with Southern African 
WCC and FOCCISA Christian Councils who 
are part ofFOCCISA 
2. 14 - 17 August SACC National Conference SACC National Executive 
2001 Committee 
3. 31 October 2001 Address by Molefe Tsele to the General-Secretary of the 
Diakonia Council of Churches SACC - Molefe Tsele 
4. 26 October - 1 Weekly Column on ANC President Mbeki 
November 2001 website, Letter from the 
president: Religious leaders 
who Immerse themselves 111 
struggle 
5. 21 November Statement calling for prevention SACC National Statement 
2001 ofMTCT 
6. 27 November High Court case against T AC took government to 
2001 government court 
7. 5 March 2002 Pledge at interfaith workshop to Minister of Health -
consolidate partnership between Manto Tshabalala-
church and state Msimang 
8. 16 April 2002 SACC statement challenging Head of SACC 
goverrunent to abandon Communications unit -
questioning of link between HIY Joe Mdlela 
and Aids 
9. 2 May 2002 Memorandum to Presidential SACC representative 
Task team on Aids (included General-Secretary Molefe 
march) Tsele 
10. 7 May 2002 SACC statement: CWS say Head of SACC 
HIY/Aids stigma IS 'un- Communications unit -
Christian ' Joe Mdlela 
II . 12 May 2002 SACC destigmatisation Address by Deputy-
conference President Jacob Zuma 
12. 3 October 2002 SACC statement on HIY/Aids National Executive 
Committee 
13. 13 February SACC cal1s for government to SACC General-Secretary 
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2003 sian NEDLAC document Molefe Tsele 
14. 14 February March to parliament with other Endorsed by General-
2003 members of civil society Secretary Molefe Tsele 
15.19 February 2003 Media statement by government Director-General of the 
on the Nedlac HIV / Aids Task Department of Labour -
Team Rams Ramashia 
16. 9 June 2003 Submission to the Portfolio SACC Parliamentary 
Committee on Social Committee 
Development 
17. 7 August 2003 National Aids Conference. Minister of Health -
Government Statement Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang 
18. 13 August 2003 Churches commit to facilitating SACC General-Secretary 
HIV / Aids treatment Molefe Tsele 
SOURCES: www.sacc.org.za, WWW.gov.co.za (see references) 
Analysis of chronology 
The above chronology is impoliant as it maps the interaction between government and 
the SACC on the issues surrounding HIV / Aids. It is clear that there has been a 
considerable amount of communication between government and the Council. However, 
the responses have not come from the president himself. Instead, it was left to others to 
state govenmlent's official position on the pandemic. What is even more noteworthy is 
that between 200 I and 2003 the SACC had only received two responses from the 
Minister of Health (who is arguably the most important person with regard to this issue) 
and one measly response from the Chairperson of the Aids Council. This is surely 
indicative of the government's inadequate response to the Aids crisis. 
When the SACC joined the debate on HIV/Aids it was at a particularly late stage of the 
epidemic. By 2001 a large number of South Africans were already infected and some 
were already experiencing the destruction of family life caused by Aids. The apparent 
reluctance of the SACC to deal with the issue prior to 2001 showed the SACC 
ambivalence about its role vis a vis the state. The 30 October 2001 speech by the General 
Secretary, Molefe Tsele, was significant because it brought matters to a head. Though 
this speech broadly outlined the mission of the SACC, it also challenged government by 
clearly indicating that the SACC would not be content with being a puppet of the state. 
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In addition the government's slow response to many of the country's crucial problems 
was criticized. By the end of that week, President Thabo Mbeki, in his weekly column 
refelTed to Dr Tsele's statements. This was to be one of the few issues where 
government wasted no time in fOlTI1ulating a reply. 
This was not the case when the SACC released its November 27th statement calling for 
PMTCT. With this statement the SACC joined a number of other civil society 
organizations that were pressuring government to provide ARY's. However, govenunent 
seemed to pay no attention to these repeated calls and had to be forced by a court order to 
provide ARY treatment to pregnant women. The next interaction between government 
and the SACC (at an interfaith workshop) was an apparent attempt by government to 
foster a better relationship with FBO 's. Deputy President Jacob Zuma made a pledge, on 
behalf of government, to work on its relationship with churches in the country. It also 
appeared to be an attempt to pacify FBO's, who were becoming increasingly vocal. 
Yet, this did not silence the SACC's criticisms of the state. A statement released barely a 
month after the interfaith workshop, received absolutely no reply from government. This 
resulted in collaboration between the SACC, T AC and other civil society organizations in 
a march and the handing over of a memorandum requesting greater cooperation between 
government and civil society. Once again this action did not evoke much response on the 
part of the state. 
When the SACC released its 7 May 2002 statement on destigmatisation, it followed this 
up with a conference on 12 May which was attended by Deputy President and chairman 
of the HIY/Aids Task Team, Jacob Zuma. The conference was held less than a week 
after the SACC statement in which it called on government and the rest of society to 
promote destigmatisation ofPL W A 's (SACC, 2002c). 
Another important challenge coming from the SACC was for government to sign the 
NED LAC document. The significance of this document stems from the fact that it was 
one of the first collaborations between all involved in order to find the best way to stem 
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the tide of HIV I Aids and to deal with its effects on the South African popUlation. 
According to the NED LAC framework agreement "the HIV/Aids epidemic is a challenge 
that faces all of society and demands a comprehensive, coordinated and united response 
to be defeated" (NED LAC agreement, 2003). However, government was dragging its 
feet with regard to signing the agreement. In March 2003 the NED LAC committee was 
informed by government that it could not agree to the framework until it had appraised 
the situation by investigating whether it possessed the capacity to implement the plans 
suggested by the framework (Health Portfolio Committee, 2003). TAC accused 
government of deliberately delaying the deal (World Socialist Web Site, 2 August 2003). 
The SACC joined the rest of civil society in calling on government to sign this document. 
In this instance a reply from government was drafted very hastily. Evidence suggests that 
the speed at which government replies to challenges and calls for action are determined 
by the content and who criticism is being directed at. In both instances where there has 
been a speedy reply from government, critique was being directed at President Thabo 
Mbeki. When President Mbeki was reported as saying that an agreement had not been 
reached between the parties at the NED LAC negotiations, COSATU accused him of not 
being truthful. In response to this claim a statement was released five days later by the 
director general of the department of labour, advocate Rams Ramashia, in an attempt to 
clear Mbeki's name. Ramashia, in return, launched a contemptuous critique at COSATU 
for challenging Mbeki's authority. It appears that more effOli went into attempts at 
protecting Mbeki's reputation than was directed at the all important issue of reaching a 
consensus about the NED LAC agreement. 
There have been two particular instances where replies from government appeared 
without delay. These were in the cases where the president had been criticized. When 
Molefe Tsele questioned the commitment of the president in running the country, Thabo 
Mbeki himself replied by questioning the allegiance of the churches in South Africa to 
the nation building project (though he did not explicitly mention the SACC, it would 
appear that he was referring to Molefe Tsele's statement). As has been discussed above, 
Mbeki did not take too kindly to being challenged on the NED LAC agreement. It 
appears that government is losing sight of the importance of tackling HIV I Aids head 011. 
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It has continually snubbed numerous calls from civil society to amend its policies to 
tackle the challenge but seems more intent on defending its image. The irony is that this 
image, as well as that of the country, would benefit greatly (both nationally and 
internationally) from a thorough and concerted plan of action regarding HIV/Aids 
SACBC response to government 
I will be following the same format when analyzing the role of the SACBC namely 
1) Content and analysis of the interactions between the SACBC and the state 
2) Provide a chronology of the interactions between the SACBC and the state. 
Contents of interactions between the SACBC and the state 
The SACBC is the "single largest provider - other than the government - of Aids 
prevention and care programmes through Southern Africa" since the start of the 
epidemic (SACBC, 2002a). This is largely because it possesses the resources and 
capacity to provide assistance to those in need. Though the provision of care has always 
been foremost on the Catholic Church's list it was only in 1999 that it really stm1ed 
dealing with the issue of HIV/Aids prevention. At the 1999 plenary session of the 
SACBC it was decided that an HlV/Aids office would be set up which would deal with 
issues concerning HIV and the role of the Catholic Church in addressing them (SACBC, 
1999c). The SACBC Aids office currently supports more than 85 projects in four out of 
the five Southern African countries that are the worst affected by the epidemic 
(Stoppard, 2001). In its plenary session in 2001 the SACBC reiterated its commitment to 
fighting this disease (SACBC, 2001a). 
However, this involvement has been overshadowed by the condom debate and the 
SACBC's refusal to endorse the use of condoms in the fight against Aids. On 12 
February 1999 the SACBC released a press statement on condom week which stated 
... condoms are not always reliable and, if a person persists in sexual promiscuity, 
he or she will be at great risk of contracting HIV I Aids even when using a condom. 
Furthermore, if an attitude of accepting that sex is now safe prevails, then the 
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condom message can l11crease rather than decrease the incidence of Aids 
(SACBC, 1999a). 5 
In an attack on govemment's Aids prevention policies, Bishop Michael Coleman accused 
the South African govemment of actively "promoting a hedonistic society" by 
encouraging the use of condoms (Nessman, 2001). Govemment retaliated by calling the 
stance of the SACBC "sad and misguided". The Department of health has been quoted as 
saying that "It is sad that one of the few methods of preventing the transmission of HIV 
and thus saving the lives of millions of our people has been characterized as "immoral"" 
(Independent Online, 21 July 200 1). Whereas the rest of civil society agrees with 
govemment on the condom issue, the SACBC has been at odds with it. It is not only its 
relationship with govemment that has been affected by this but also its relationship with 
the rest of civi l society. 
The SACBC's stance on condoms has brought it into disagreement with the SACC6 
According to the SACC "Catholicism was failing to take the realities of the world into 
consideration". The SACC, on the other hand, accepts the use of condoms as an 
important weapon in the prevention of HIV/ Aids and argued that its use should therefore 
not be condemned (Mdlela, 2003). It is seen by many as the biggest weapon in the fight 
S This caused outrage, not just in South Africa but in the international community as welL A news article 
by the UN Integrated Regional Information Network repo11ed that government was 'saddened ' by the 
Catholic Church's refusal to budge on the condom issue. This has been an extremely contentious issue 
between the Roman Catholic Church and other organizations involved in the fight against Aids. Despite 
numerous ca lls for the bishops to reconsider their beliefs on condom use, they have refused to compromise 
their view that condoms interfere with conception and therefore the gift of life and that they are for this 
reason against Catholic policy (IRIN, 2001). 
() In response to the criticism that they were receiving because of the condom issue, the SACBC released a 
press statement on 23 February 2002 that challenged those who have questioned the conn'ibution of the 
Catholic Church to curbing the spread of HIV/Aids. It stated that the National Health Department has 
acknowledged the importance of the Catholic Church as their various parishes and community work has 
allowed them to have close contact with the most vulnerable in society. The statement reiterates the stance 
of the Catholic Church that condoms do not work and that instead their approach to the HIV challenge has 
been centered on education and prevention through abstinence. This statement is essentia lly a chal1enge to 
sentiments that the Cathol ic Church's condom stance might have done more to hurt the cause due to its 
unrealistic expectations . According to the statement the Catholic Church has concentrated its efforts on the 
forgotten and marginalized in society who suffer most from government's delay in providing ARV's and 
other medical ass istance (SACBC, 2002a). However, it does not take into cons ideration that this is the very 
group in society that have had to resort to sex in order to survive and for whom sex has become a political 
weapon and bargaining tool. 
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against Aids and it is often argued that the bishop's view is not a realistic one as it does 
not take into consideration the real challenges that people are faced with and that prevent 
them from abstaining from sexual relations whether coerced or vo luntary. 
Despite the furore caused by the bishop 's refusal to endorse condoms, this has not been 
the extent of their involvement. They have pledged their support for organizations that 
are invo lved in finding adequate ways to deal with HIV/Aids and for initiatives and 
programmes that fight for the rights of PLWA's. The SACBC's horizontal relationship 
with the rest of civil society has been characterized by a major paradox. On the one 
hand the SACBC is wi lling to work with other civil society organizations yet at the same 
time it remains at loggerheads with these very allies. The SACBC expressed its 
wi llingness to engage in joint action on September 221999 when it supported TAC and 
its actions particularly the latter's pressuring of those in power to provide for the needs 
of the victims of HI V and their families (SACBC, 1999b). According to the statement 
... to the extent that the Treatment Action Campaign is working to ensure that 
People with Aids have access to qual ity treatment that can be afforded; that new 
infections are prevented or at least minimized by change of behaviour and that the 
state makes quality and affordable healthcare available to all , the Southern 
African Bishops' Conference fu lly SUppOltS the campaign (SACBC, 1999b) . 
On II April 2002, the bishops joined the rest of civi l society in calling on government to 
make avai lable the treatment that would prevent MTCT and would save the li ves of 
innocent children who would otherwise be born with this disease and be orphaned 
because of it (SACBC, 2002b). The SACBC also released a joint statement with TAC, 
the Anglican Church and COSATU in which it voiced its commitment to the Aids 
epidemic by joining forces in order to seek real and valid solutions. This statement 
articulates their joint decision to set up a working group that would liaise with 
representatives of the South African National Aids Council (SANAC) in order to guide 
policies on Aids. In addi tion they urged government to declare Aids a National 
Emergency and for it to increase the health budget and take the impact of Aids into 
consideration when making policies (T AC, 2002) . 
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On 20 March 2003 the SACBC released a statement that endorsed a march planned by 
TAC. According to the statement the SACBC notes 
".with dismay and frustration the way in which the Ministry of Health continues 
to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Too much time and effort is being wasted 
on ongoing debates around HIV/AIDS. South Africa with one of the highest 
AIDS prevalence rates in the world and situated in the corridor of the worst 
infected and affected region cannot continue to watch thousands of people dying 
daily. We urge to the goverrunent to work speedily on implementing a treatment 
plan, an investment in a better health care delivery for all (SACBC, 2003c). 
Despite its support for TAC's campaign of civil disobedience it also recommitted its 
support for government's planned roll out of AR V's and challenged it to save the lives of 
many South Africans who are already sick and dying and whose only hope of survival is 
access to ARV's (SACBC, 2003c). However, at the time of writing the Catholic Church 
had decided to take matters into its own hands by pledging to provide ARV's. It released 
a 2 July 2004 statement that it was to introduce the provision of ARV's to Catholic 
facilities. In February 2004 it started the rollout of its programme of providing 22 of its 
140 facilities with HIV/Aids drugs (SACBC, 2004). 
Analysis of content of responses between the SACBC and the state 
There has not been much direct interaction between the government and the SACBC. 
This is mainly due the fact that the Catholic Church has largely been concerned with 
concentrating its efforts on the provision of care for those who are sick because of Aids. 
The Catholic Church is second only to the state in providing HIV/Aids care. With regard 
to prevention plans, the Catholic Church has maintained that the only way to stop the 
spread of the pandemic is through the promotion of abstinence instead of condoms. 
Because of this stance it has repeatedly been at loggerheads with government as well as 
different members of civil society including the SACC, of which it is a member. Despite 
a lot of pressure to change its condom stance it has remained resolute on this issue. 
Though TAC, COSATU and the Anglican Church have not agreed with the SACBC on 
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condoms, this has not prevented them from engaging in joint actions with the Catholic 
Church. This is evident from the release of the joint statement between these four parties 
on HIV / Aids. However, it is interesting to note that such interaction and cooperation has 
not been a theme of the SACBC's relationship with the SACCo Though the SACBC is a 
full member of the Council, it has chosen instead to act on its own in certain 
circumstances for example its 2004 statement that it was preparing to make ARV's 
available in its capacity as the Catholic Church. This action was also an important and 
critical response to government's delay in providing these Aids drugs and implies a 
weakness on the part of government to provide for its citizens. 
The South African government has been particularly vehement in its response to the 
SACC while the same cannot be said of its reactions to the SACBC. Though it criticized 
the Conference's stance on condoms and called its position misguided, it has not 
unleashed the same amount of criticism as it has on the SACCo In his statement on 
Bishop Tutu's birthday (in which he replied to Molefe Tsele speech) Thabo Mbeki spoke 
about the role of churches as a whole but it appears that he was referring to the SACC in 
particular. The Bishop Michael Coleman's statement that the government was 
'promoting a hedonistic society' did not receive the same amount of attention or warrant 
as quick a response. A possible explanation for this is that the Catholic Church, though it 
was involved in the liberation struggle, did not have the same relationship with the ANC 
as was the case with the SACCo Thus the Catholic Church does not find itself in the 
same predicament as the SACC where it has to re-evaluate its role with government. 
Table 1.2 Chronology of the interactions between the SACBC and the state 
Date Forn10fResponse Who/what level 
1. 1999 Plenary Session: Decision Southern African Bishops 
to set up Aids office 
2. 12 February 1999 Press statement on the use SACBC Media Office 
of condoms 
3. 22 September 1999 Statement expressmg Secretary-General of 
support for the Treatment SACBC: Fr. Richard 
Action Campaign Menatsi 
4. 2001 Plenary Session: Southem African Bishops 
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Reiterated commitment to 
fighting Aids 
5. 31 July2001 Government pops condom Bishop Michael Coleman 
bubble: Attack on 
government prevention 
policies 
6. 31 July 2001 Department of Health South African Department 
response to condom issue of Health 
7. 21 September 200 1 Joint statement with Zackie Achmat, Willie 
TAC,Church of the Madisha, Njongonkulu 
Province of South Africa Ndungane, Richard 
(CPSA) and COSATU Menatsi 
8. II April 2002 Statement calling on SACBC Aids Office 
government to make ARY 
treatment available to 
prevent MTCT 
9. 20 March 2003 Statement endorsing T AC Anthony Ambrose/Alison 
march Munro 
10. 2 July 2004 Antiretroviral therapy 111 Father Mathibela 
South African Catholic Sebothoma 
facilities 
Sources: www.sacbc.org.za, www.gov.co.za 
An alysis of chronology 
Despite the inadequate responses received by the SACC from government, it was 
undoubtedly better than that received by the SACBC. The above chronology shows just 
how hard it has been for the Catholic Church to receive an adequate response from 
government. On the one occasion that government did reply to the SACBC's repeated 
calls; it came in the fonn of a statement from the Health Department and did not even 
warrant a direct response from the minister of health or even the chairperson of the Aids 
council. The relationship (or lack thereof) between govenunent and the SACBC requires 
a lot of work and commitment particularly on the part of government who has completely 
turned a blind eye to the resources and potential of the SACBC. This behaviour by 
government could tum out to be very costly in the long term. 
The Catholic Aids office was established in 1999 and with it a coordinated HIY/Aids 
plan was introduced by the Catholic Bishops Conference. In February 1999 the Bishops 
35 
released a statement on the use of condoms. This has led to much debate and uproar as it 
has been seen as an irresponsible move on the part of the Catholic Church. The decision 
by the Catholic Church to ban the use of condoms was not welcomed in government 
circles, which has largely based its prevention strategy on the distribution of condoms 
and the promotion of the use of condoms by South Africa's sexually active popUlation. 
Though the Catholic Church had already expressed its stance on condoms in 1999, it was 
only until two years later in 2001 that the South African government reacted to this 
position. It joined a number of other groups in calling on the bishops to rethink their 
stance but this has not swayed the Catholic Church which continues to promote 
abstinence as the only way to be safe from HIV infection. 
In 1999 the SACBC also aligned itself with the aims of the T AC when it endorsed the 
organization's actions and campaigns. T AC was only forn1ed in 1999 and was initially 
not conceived as much of a threat against government. This could be the reason why this 
statement by the bishops to support TAC had gone unanswered and seemingly unnoticed 
by government. In 2001 the SACBC again joined TAC when it released ajoint statement 
with the Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSUI Anglican Church) and 
COSATU. The statement called on government to speed up campaigns that would assist 
those living with Aids. In another show of support for TAC and its objectives, the 
SACBC released a 20 March 2003 media statement endorsing the planned civil 
disobedience campaign of TAC. Both these statements went unanswered by government. 
On 2 July 2004, the SACBC announced its decision to provide ARV's free of charge to 
HIV positive people. This was an indictment of government's delay in providing drugs 
that would improve as well as save many lives. The interaction between the SACBC and 
government leaves much to be desired. On the part of government there has only been a 
response on the condom issue. It has not replied to other calls and challenges made by 
the Catholic Church. This is perhaps an indication of the lack a relationship between 
government and the SACBC. It appears that more importance is awarded by government 
to the statements and actions of the SACCo 
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Tone of SACC and SACBC interactions 
The SACC has found itself in a difficult situation with the state because of its forn1er 
relationship with the ANC and the UDF and has therefore tried to couch its statements in 
a tone that does not seem anti-government. Despite the fact that the initial statements and 
decisions of the SACC are characterized by an attempt to maintain the middle ground, it 
gradually became more aggressive in its pronouncements on the state's Aids policies. 
When govemment did not react to demands from civil society and the broader public, the 
SACC became more insistent and forceful in its demands and refused to be pacified by 
government. 
In instances where it has responded directly to the SACC (as in the case of Thabo 
Mbeki 's statements about the church) government has bad a decidedly vitriolic and harsh 
undertone. Because of the reluctance of the SACC to show all out support for 
government and its actions, it has accused the Council of being deserters of the liberation 
project. As a result, the SACC's al legiance to the nation-building project has been 
questioned and this has caused a rift between government and the Council. Those in 
power have not taken kindly to being questioned and this was apparent in their responses 
to criticism. Government's tones and responses range from one extreme to the other. In 
some instances it has taken a very conciliatory tone and attempted to appease the SACC 
by attending consultations organised by the Council and pledging its support. However, 
Mbeki 's government has also taken an extremely aggressive and defensive tone when 
being questioned by civil society organisations. 
The relationship (between government and the SACC) in 2004 still seemed to be on 
relatively rocky ground if one considers the recent speech made by President Mbeki at 
the triennial conference of the SACC on 12 July 2004. President Mbeki congratulated 
the SACC on the work that they had done during the struggle but at the san1e time 
chastised it for its involvement in civil society. According to Mbeki ' . .. it has become 
fashionable among some in our society, including some who claim to have contributed to 
the democratic yictory, to position themselves as what are called watchdogs or advocacy 
groups' (Mbeki , 2004). He suggested that the role of the Council 'should on the contrary, 
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in the main satisfy itself with the task of observing, analyzing and assessing the actions of 
those who continue to act as agents of changes, instead of being content merely to 
criticize or approve what others are striving to achieve' (Mbeki, 2004). Given that the 
SACC has spent the last four years immersing itself in civil society and chastising 
govemment about its policies and particularly its policies on HIV/Aids, this statement by 
the president is very significant. It shows what the govemment expects of the church and 
appears as an admonishment of the actions that they have recently been involved in. 
Like the SACC and other civil society actors, the SACBC has been very critical of 
govel1lment particularly with regard to its policies on ARV's. The SACBC launched a 
scathing attack on govemment's handling of HIV/Aids. It accused govel1lment of 
promoting a ' hedonistic society' without morals and values. The Bishops also criticized 
govel1lment's prevention policies. Govemment could only muster a mild rebuke to thi s 
accusation by calling the SACBC's policies sad and misguided. In its 20 March 2003 
statement endorsing TAC's march, the SACBC expressed annoyance and exasperation 
with govel1lment for wasting time and effort on debates that are doing nothing to find a 
solution to the problem. The state has not followed the same course of action that it has 
with the SACCo It has repeatedly attempted to get the Council to toe the line and ally 
itself with the ruling power. Though it has criticised the SACBC 's stance it has not done 
so with as much fervour as when it was attacking the SACC. 
Analysis of the effect of the SACC and SACBC's alliances on its 
relationships with government 
The above tone suggests a degree of insecurity and suspicion on the part of govemment. 
Many former allies in the liberation movement have expressed their dissatisfaction and 
disagreement with the policies implemented by the state. Not only has the SACC 
suggested that it would not allow its policies to be dictated by govemment but COSATU 
showed that it is no longer willing to toe a party line that does not benefit its constituents. 
As a member of the govemment's tripartite alliance together with the South African 
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Communist Party, COSA TV has often been faced with the option to toe the line or leave 
the alliance whose fragile existence has been tlu'eatened on numerous occasions. 
COSA TV has found new allies and the trade union has increasingly become much more 
vocal in its criticism of govenunent. 
These actions have presented a challenge to Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance project 
as civil disobedience could have negative implications for South Africa's status as the 
leading country in Africa. How is Mbeki to be taken seriously by other countries if his 
own citizens are taking him to court and engaging in civil disobedience in protest against 
his policies? Mbeki has acknowledged the importance of a vibrant independent civil 
society " ... this (civil society) is perfectly legitimate and may very well be a necessary 
task in ensuring that the democratic victory does not lose its way and betray the hopes of 
millions who fought for the liberty we all enjoy" (Mbeki, 2004). However, it seems that 
he wants both a civil society that advocates for the rights of the people but at the same 
time one that does not threaten his government with civil disobedience, It is for this 
reason that his appeal to the SACC to "play its part among the forces in our country that 
have defined themselves as actors for the progressive reconstruction and development of 
our country" is so important as it suggests that the SACC become an ally of govenunent. 
Given that it is losing support from long time allies, COSATV and the SACP, this is not 
surpnsmg, 
The SACBC has chosen to ally itself with those fighting the HIV/Aids cause within civil 
society, It is an ardent supporter of TAC's civil disobedience campaign, However, its 
alliances have not significantly impacted on its relationship with government. Given the 
fact that they do not have much of a reciprocal relationship except for the odd statement, 
this does not impact very heavily on the SACBC-state association, What is significant 
for government, though, is the fact that civil society is increasingly working together to 
make the state more accountable, This could lead to a certain amount of paranoia and 
insecurity in govemment circles as it might feel that its authority is being challenged, 
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Conclusion 
The SACC continues to command a large sphere of influence. In addition, it has allied 
itself with actors, like T AC, and this has garnered the Counci l a lot of respect and a large 
fo llowing. COSATU enjoys a similar profile as most South Africans who are affected by 
HIV/Aids are workers who belong to trade unions. With one of the most vocal and 
influential individuals (Archbishop Ndungane) leading the way in the fight against Aids, 
the Anglican Church, which is a member of the SACC, is a vital and important asset 
given its vocal denunciation of government's inadequate Aids policies. Together, these 
groups make a formidable learn and scored major victories when the South African coul1s 
ru led in their favour. Nonetheless, both the influence of the SACBC and the SACC has 
to a large part been detelmined by their all iances with other civil society organizations. 
Judging by the information above, real action by govenm1ent has only happened when 
civil society joined together in civil disobedience campaigns and legal action. Despite 
the attendance at the marches and the number of people who have supported the demands 
that were made, even civil disobedience has not made a significant enough impact on 
government to review its Aids policies. There is still a long way to go before South 
Africa has an adequate structure in place to deal with the scourge of Aids. 
Groups like TAC, COSATU, the SACC and the SACBC have revived the idea of popular 
participation and activism that allo\\' for ordinary people to have a say in po licy and 
decision making. Civil society alliances have brought the ordinary face of HIV/Aids to 
the public's attention. 
The SACC and SACBC have both, for the most part, been vocal and challenging of 
government's policies. A major obstacle for the churches has been their reluctance to 
discuss certain issues regarding sexuality and the moral arguments that accompany it. 
They have since been able to put this aside as Aids is a problem that affects all and the 
church turning a blind eye to the epidemic would have worsened the situation. The 
church has thus far performed well in challenging govenunent and making demands that 
would benefit millions of people. During the first few years of democracy, both could to 
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some extent have been blamed for being too close to the state and given the history of 
this country this is perhaps understandable and was in some ways unavoidable. What is 
important for this issue, however, is that this has not remained the case. Both the 
SACBC and SACC have managed to maintain their neutrality and have avoided being 
co-opted by government. Though they have not been as outspoken as T AC, who has 
been willing to take legal action against the state, they have shown support for this type 
of action. I have shown that the SACC and the SACBC have criticized government when 
necessary and have pledged support and cooperation on other occasions. With regard to 
the issue of HIV/Aids both have managed to maintain a relationship of critical solidarity 
with the state. The speech given by general-secretary, Molefe Tsele, was extremely 
significant of the position that the SACC perceives itself as playing in society. Though it 
states that it does not want to be regarded as anti-government, it also very clearly states 
that Thabo Mbeki and his government are not beyond critique. 
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Chapter 3 
The SACC and SACBC response to South Africa's debt 
situation 
Introduction 
It is necessary to briefly explain the basic definitions and debates surrounding South 
Africa ' s debt. When the ANC assumed power in 1994 it inherited many of the previous 
government's problems including its debts. The Mandela government had to take on the 
responsibility of repaying both foreign and domestic debts. However, it must be noted 
that this chapter will only be concerned wi th issues relating to the public foreign debts 
owed by the state and does not include private foreign debts of financial institutions 
within the country. Rudin (1999: 7) estimates that in 1993 South Africa's foreign debt 
totalled R160.105 billion. For a country that has the major task of development and 
reversing the ills created by apartheid this is a large amount. However, the Jubilee Debt 
Campaign argues that the debt should not be repaid as it was incuned by an illegitimate 
regime for illegitimate reasons. 
The Jubilee Debt Campaign was fomled in the United Kingdom in 1996 and its aims are 
to convince the developed world that debts owed by the developing nations are odious 
and illegitimate and should therefore be cancelled as debt servicing costs billions which 
could have been used on health and other fonns of social spending. According to Adams 
(cited in Rudin, 1999: 4) odious debt occurs when 
... a despotic power incurs debt(s) not for the needs or in the interest of the State, 
but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against 
it ... or to co lonise it(s telTitories) with members of the dominant nationality, etc. , 
these debts are odious to the indigenous population ... 
In South Africa it can hard ly be disputed that the loans received by the apaliheid 
govenunent were primarily intended to keep the majority of South Africans subjugated 
and inferior and are therefore illegitimate. Adams (cited in Rudin, 1999: 5) uses cites 
another definition by Alexander Sack which argues that 
42 
Odious debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge of the creditors, 
are contrary to the interests of the nation do not fulfill one of the conditions that 
determine the legality of the debts of the State ... The creditors have committed a 
hostile act with regard to the people; they can't therefore expect a nation freed 
from a despotic power to assume the 'odious' debts, which are the personal debts 
of that power. 
Thus the illegitimacy of the apa11heid regime renders all loans and assistance that it 
received as illegitimate.(Rudin 1999: 9). According to research by Madorin and Wellmer 
(2000: 10-11) creditors who issued loans to apartheid South Africa were aware of the 
situation and were able to pressurize the South African government to reform. Their 
failure to do so makes them culpable as they were benefiting from apartheid. Thus they 
were instrumental in contributing to the apartheid regime's continued existence. In 1998 
Jubilee South Africa was formed in order to 'call for the cancellation of both the 
Apartheid debt and the Apartheid and destabilisation-induced heavy debts of 
neighbouring South African countries: and to supp011 the international cancellation of all 
Third World debt ' (Jubilee 2000 SA: 2001). 
The purpose of this chapter is to investi gate the involvement ofthe SACC and SACBC in 
the Jubilee campaign and to detemline to what extent their contribution to the debt 
campaign infom1s their civil society characteristics. Unlike Chapter 2, I will not separate 
the actions and involvements of the SACC and the SACBC as all actions and decisions 
(involving civil soc iety) with regard to South Africa's debt have taken place under the 
national umbrella body of Jubilee 2000 South AfTica. The SACC and SACBC (both 
founding members of Jubilee South Africa) were the two most important and biggest 
groups in the Jubilee initiative. However, some tension developed within the coalition 
which led to the Council and the Bishops Conference becoming less active in Jubilee 
decision-making in 2004. Though this does not imply that they have distanced 
themselves from the movement and its principles, this sensitive issue has had a number of 
implications with regard to the ability of the Jubilee campaign and civil society as a 
whole, to deal with the debt si tuation . However, this will be discussed later in the 
chapter. 
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First it is important to look at the actions of Jubilee 2000 South Africa (which changed to 
Jubilee South Africa in 2001) since its inception in 1998 as a campaign to end debt owed 
by developing countries, through to its evolution into a coalition of civil society 
organisations in South Africa whose primary aim it is to hold accountable those who have 
benefited from the illegitimate apartheid regime. It has thus changed its mission from 
one that merely addresses the cancellation of debt owed by Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC's) to include the call for the cancellation of odious debt. The campaign 
has been largely concerned with reparations which it argues is owed by those who 
benefited from apartheid, to compensate its victims. 
Content of interactions between Jubilee and the state 
When government introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan (GEAR) 
it committed itself to debt repayment (this despite the fact that it was spending less on 
poverty alleviation and social services due to debt servicing). Its argument was that it 
wanted to encourage tmst in the South African economy in order to invite investment 
(Sowetan, 24 June 1998). According to Gill Marcus (Sowetan, 24 June 1998) "we cannot 
expect to borrow if we do not honour existing debt commitments. Ifwe were to write off 
the debt, we would either not be able to borrow, or only do so at ever more exorbitant 
rates of interest". Jubilee's position however was that the writing off of debt should not 
influence future investments or loans to South Africa because debt is odious and 
therefore illegitimate and unenforceable. The Founding Declaration of the Jubilee 2000 
South Africa Campaign argued that "the stmggle against apartheid continues until all 
apaliheid's debts have been cancelled within Southern Africa" (SACC, 1998a). Thus, 
until South Africa is freed from its debt burden and is able to use its resources to improve 
the lives of its citizens, it is still suffering under the yoke of apaliheid. According to the 
statement made by Jubilee "apartheid is now forcing its victims to pay twice over for 
their suffering" (SACC, 1998a). 
Though Jubilee South Africa supports the international call for debt cancellation of all 
African countries as well as its other Southern counterparts, its main challenge has been 
to eradicate all debt incurred by South Africa, during apartheid, as well as the broader 
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Southern African region which was affected by apaliheid South Africa's destabilisation 
policies. Together with its international paliners, Jubilee South Africa was involved in 
the international campaign to collect 100 000 signatures by the end of 1999 for the 
Jubilee 2000 petition for debt cancellation. In addition Jubilee South Africa has also 
taken the initiative in organising a Jubilee South-South summit on 20 November 1999, 
attended by Asian and South American countries. The summit was intended to address 
debt cancellation from the perspective of developing countries directly affected by debt 
servicing (Jubilee 2000, 2001). 
Despite all the activity surrounding the Jubilee campaign, there was still little response 
from the South African government. An article published by the Mail and Guardian on 1 
October 1999 argued that the success of Africa's renewal rests on its ability to force the 
West to cancel illegitimate debt. According to the aliicle "If Mbeki and the ANC cannot 
or will not declare their full support for Jubilee 2000, then they must not utter another 
word to the public about the virtues of the "African Renaissance" ... " (Mail and 
Guardian, 1 October 1999). This a very serious challenge to government as the African 
Renaissance project is the brainchild of President Thabo Mbeki, who has promoted his 
plan as the answer to Africa's revival. 
Government's main argument has been that its support for the Jubilee campaign would 
deter future investment in the country and hamper the ability of the South AfTican 
government to acquire loans. The Jubilee 2000 publication, Apartheid Debt: Questions 
and answers (published on 10 September 1999) challenged this argument as unfounded 
because despite South Africa's good credit rating (due to stringent policies introduced by 
GEAR) and the fact that the country's economic environment has been made more 
favourable, investment has not been what it should be. Instead of experiencing an 
increase in growth, investment in South Africa has declined from 9.2% in 1976 to 0.9% 
in 1996 (Rudin, 2000: 20). However, the South Afiican government's actions continue to 
be controlled by the international economy as it courts the West in order to encourage 
investment in this country. This strategy is challenged and criticized by Jubilee and it has 
prompted them to conclude 
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if our government's fears (regarding investment) are well -founded, if it is the 
faceless financial markets, the selfish profit-seekers from abroad who ultimately 
tell our government what to do, then the struggle for national liberation has sti ll to 
be won (Rudin, 2000 : 21). 
Another argument made by government is that South Africa's foreign debt only makes up 
about 5% of the country's total debt and that it would lose its credit worthiness if it did 
not honour existing loans. In addition they have argued that most of these loans were 
made only after the ANC government came into power (Mail and Guardian, 8 December 
2000). Yet, government seems to be missing a very important point. Jubilee is not 
encouraging it to renege on debt payments . Instead the coalition is trying to convince 
creditors to cancel the debts. FUlthermore, many of the post 1994 loans were incurred in 
order to equip the new government to deal with the results of apartheid. Despite this, 
government refused to comment on debt cancellation and remained firm in its decision 
not to engage itself in Jubilee South Africa 's debt campaign. 
In 2000 the then National Secretary of Jubilee SA, Neville Gabriel, addressed the 
Okinawa conference of G8 world leaders in an attempt to lobby the industrialized 
countries for debt cancellation. He cited the cancellation of debt as part of "a much 
broader campaign for global economic justice and social transformation" (Gabriel, 2000: 
40). He also argued for debt cancellation on the grounds that it is historically, politically, 
legally, morally and economically illegi ti mate. Gabriel criticized the industrialized 
nations' demands for payments from impoverished Southern countries who have already 
repaid their debt many times over and who are dominated by unequal and unfair trade 
relations that only serve to widen the already large gap between the North and South 
(Gabriel , 2000 : 40). This was not the only call emanating from South Africa for the 
cancellation of debt. The SACC, on 2 I July 2000, urged the G8 to pay heed to Jubilee' s 
calls so that the few resources that the South does manage to hold on to can be used for 
social development and the rebuilding of poor and marginalised communities (SACC, 
2000a). However, their demands fell on deaf ears. Even calls (to review debt 
repayments) by President Thabo Mbeki and President Olusegun Obasanjo seemed to go 
unheeded. It is ironic that barely two years later these two African leaders were touting 
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their "African" plan for renewal in the form of NEPAD which some have argued is little 
more than a "sell out" of Africa to the West. The relationship proposed in this document 
between Africa and the West would be no more than a repeat of their fomler exploitative 
relationships and does not support calls for debt cancellation but instead proposes ways 
fo r Afi-ica to repay its debt (Bond, 2002). 
The outcome, of the G8 summit in Okinawa, was far from favourable. The leading 
countries in the world had promised to address the debt owed by the HIPC 's. 
Consequently, the World Bank and IMF introduced the HIPC initiative in 1996. 
Although this initiative claims to help poor countries, the opposite is true. Instead of the 
debt burden being removed by cancelling the remaining debt owed, these countries have 
to implement policies (similar to Structural Adjustment Policies) that are intended to 
ensure that they are able to meet their debt repayments. The only debt that is written off 
is the unserviceable debt which the poor countries would in any case never be able to pay 
(Bond, 2001: 27). Though promises of debt relief were reiterated at the Cologne summit 
of G7 leaders in 1999 they have yet to be honoured. The summit was presented with a 
petition containing more than 17 million signatures in suppOli of debt cancellation. This 
prompted the world leaders to finally address the debt issue and resulted in a commitment 
that debt would be reduced and ultimately cancelled. However, by the time that the G7 
met in Okinawa in 2000, only about 1.2% of the debt had been cancelled (Toussaint, 
2000). According to a 24 July 2000 statement by Jubilee South Africa 
The G7 have attempted to rehash old pledges that have failed , effectively 
imposing further conditions on the promises of limited debt cancellation that have 
yet to be del ivered a year after they were made in Cologne. None of the countries 
promised debt cancellation under the GTs "Enhanced HIPC Initiative" has 
received it. Yet, the G7 misleadingly notes that "progress (has been) made" 
(Jubilee SA, 2000). 
The reluctance of the developed nations to re-evaluate the debt burden of the HIPC's (for 
which South Africa does not qualify), does not bode well for South Africa's apartheid 
debt problem. South Africa is by far better off than many other developing countries and 
in a better position to repay its debt. Yet, Jubilee maintains that South Africa's debt is 
illegitimate and should for that reason not be paid . In addition, if one considers that the 
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majority of South Africans live in absolute poverty it is misleading to think that South 
Africa is actually in a position where it can afford to service foreign debt. 
Despite the SACC and the SACBC being two of the primary members of the Jubilee 
2000 South Africa coalition, the events that took place in 2002 wonld soon show a 
growing divide in the Jubilee campaign. In July 2002 Jubilee South Africa chairman, 
M.P. Giyose, took part in the G8 summit proceedings in Canada together with the Jubilee 
National Secretary, Neville Gabriel. This was the same summit at which Thabo Mbeki 
was to present his plan for the renewal of Africa in the fOlm of the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD has been hailed by Mbeki as the answer to 
Africa's problems despite the fact that some of its key recommendations for Africa's 
renewal include privatisation policies which would not benefit the poor. In addition the 
NEPAD document does not promote the cancellation of debt. This has resulted in civil 
society actors taking to the streets in protest against it. According to Bond (2002) 
NEPAD is not what it claims to be namely "a new framework of interaction with the rest 
of the world ... based on the agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives 
and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny" but is instead a framework 
developed without the input of the people and "owes nothing to Africa's social 
struggles". If it were indeed true that NEP AD was designed by the African people, the 
ones that would be most affected by it, then it would not be so tolerant of issues like debt 
repayments and privatisation. It would be more conscious of the effects that the proposed 
policies and initiatives within the NEPAD plan would have on the most vulnerable within 
African society. 
It is for this reason that civil society activists have protested NEPAD's implementation. 
The lack of consensus on NEPAD signalled the beginning of a growing rift within 
Jubilee. The SACC was initially in agreement with other civil society organisations with 
regard to NEPAD. Though the Council was not completely opposed to the idea behind 
the NEPAD initiative, it questioned the way the document was drafted and how it 
proposed to address the problems experienced by African countries. Molefe Tsele 
(2002), during a presentation to the Ministerial Roundtable of the UN International 
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Conference on Financing for Development, called NEP AD "premature" and argued that 
it cannot work in its present form as it is "a partnership with African leaders without 
African People". The SACBC levelled similar criticism at NEPAD calling it "seriously 
lacking because there has been no consultation with Africa's citizenry, without whose 
active participation there can be no real partnership and no real development" (SACBC, 
2002). However, a media release by the SACC on 3 April 2002 indicated a shift in the 
Council's position on NEPAD. It stated that "The SACC fully endorses NEPAD as a 
new commitment by the African leaders to put the continent on an accelerated path of 
development". Though they expressed reservations about the project these did not extend 
as much to the content as to the fact that it lacks people driven initiatives (SACC, 2002). 
This position has led to a considerable amount of confusion and disagreement amongst 
some of the SACC's civil society partners. If the SACC was to continue being a member 
of Jubilee, its position on NEPAD was a threat to its continued relationship with the 
Jubilee campaigners. Jubilee South Africa questioned the SACC's continued support for 
the debt campaign and argued that NEP AD contradicts the aims of the jubilee initiative. 
In an interview with Molefe Tsele (29 October 2004) he argued that the SACC is not 
required to consult with its partners when deciding the Council's official positions and 
statements. The SACC came to its decision after holding numerous workshops and 
consultations with government. As a result of these consultations the SACC made the 
official decision to endorse NEPAD. In the general secretary's view, this position should 
have no bearing or influence on the Council's pattnership with Jubilee as the SACC 
remains committed to debt cancellation (Tsele, 2004). The implications of the resulting 
tense relationship between the SACC and Jubilee leadership will be discussed later in this 
chapter. For now it is important to look at the events that finally convinced the South 
African government to take an official stance on debt and become involved in attempts to 
find a resolution to this debate. 
On 12 November 2002 Jubilee, together with the Khulumani 7 support group, instituted 
legal action against 21 American, British, German and Swiss multinational corporations. 
) Khulumani was established in 1995 during the TRC hearings as an umbrella body functioning under the 
Centre for the study ofYiolence and Reconciliation. It became an independent movement in 1999 and took 
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According to a statement issued by Jubilee South Africa these "corporations aided and 
abetted a crime against humanity whose persistent social damage requires urgent repair" 
(Jubilee SA, 2002). The statement went on to say that the defendants in the case 
... made massive profits while the suffering of the victims of apartheid intensified. 
The banks and businesses have consistently ignored our attempts to engage in 
discussion about their role in suppol1ing broad social programmes for the 
reconstruction of development of affected communities and in compensating 
specific individuals for the damage that the corporations made possible (Jubilee 
SA, 2002). 
The SACC supported this action and approved of the choice of Michael Hausfeld to 
represent the claimants. Except for the occasional statement that it would continue 
servicing its debt in order to attract foreign investment, government had been very careful 
in distancing itself from the Jubilee campaign. In an interview with the Business Day 
Newspaper Justice Minister Penuell Maduna (BUSiness Day, 25 November 2002) stated 
that government would remain neutral by "neither suppoliing nor rejecting the lawsuits". 
According to Maduna, government aimed to attract investment from these countries (the 
defendants in the litigation suit) in order to provide benefits for all within South Africa 
instead of resorting to court action in order to get benefits for only a few individuals. 
However, Jubilee chairperson, M.P. Giyose argued that government's statement did not 
hold water as there had hardly been any fore ign investments in South Africa since a 
democratic government was elected in 1994 (Business Day, 25 November 2002). In a 27 
November 2002 press statement Jubilee stated 
In all our discussions with South African government ministries it is clear that the 
position of the South African government is neither to oppose nor to actively 
support the reparations lawsuits, since citizens have an undeniable right to legal 
recourse. The rule of intemational human rights law must be upheld (SACBC, 
2002). 
By 2003 there was a decisive change in the South African govemment's response to 
Jubilee South Africa's court action. Though President Mbeki reiterated that "the South 
African Govemment is not and will not be party to such litigation" it was clear that he did 
not welcome Jubilee's actions (Mbeki , 2003). In his address to parliament, during the 
up the role of providing a voice for the victims of apartheid . Since the eod of the TRC proceedings it has 
been involved with the Jubilee campaign to negotiate reparations for apartheid victims 
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tabling of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, he presented govemment's 
position as the following 
. .. we (govemment) consider it completely unacceptable that matters that are 
central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts which 
bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country and the observance of the 
perspective contained in our constitution of the promotion of national 
reconciliation. While Government recognises the right of citizens to institute 
legal action, its own approach is informed by the desire to involve all South 
Africans, including corporate citizens, in a co-operative and voluntary partnership 
to reconstruct and develop South African society (Mbeki, 2003). 
Despite govel11ment's initial "indifference" to Jubilee South Africa's reparations 
campaign it finally gave up its "si lence" in July 2003. Though the South African 
govel11ment reiterated its fears that foreign investment in the country would be hampered 
by legal action and changed its position from indifference to active opposition to the legal 
actions lodged in the United States. Penuell Maduna, handed a nine page affidavit to a 
US court in which the South African govemment appealed to the courts to dismiss the 
legal claims of the jubilee campaigners (fOL, 26 July 2003). Maduna reportedly admitted 
to a 'deal' that had been reached between govemment and the defendants in the court 
cases. The businesses (named in the litigation suit) agreed to invest in South Afiica if the 
South African government agreed to support it in its aims to get the courts to dismiss the 
legal actions brought against it (fOL, 29 June 2003). According to Maduna (fOL, 29 June 
2003) "They (businesses) said they are willing to work with us to convince American 
courts that as South Africans we can find workable and less destructive solutions. They 
are prepared to make that commitment of contributions to reparations". Thus 
govemment decided to work towards a mediated settlement that it claims would benefit 
both the victims and those businesses involved in the claim. 
This change in government response was announced during the August Civil Society 
conference on reparations, organised by the SACCo The conference was intended to 
stimulate interaction between Jubilee, government and the business community. In his 
address to the conference, Maduna suggested that the claimants, together with 
govel11ment and the accused companies should attempt to find a solution that would 
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benefit all. Government's decision appeared to be a very strategic move as it was an 
attempt to accommodate both parties since it would stand to gain more from a negotiated 
settlement (Business Day, 28 August 2003). However, this attempt at mediation was 
hampered when the business sector chose not to attend the civil society conference. In 
addition, government continued to support the view that legal action would slow down 
South Africa's economic development. It has not been able to convince both business 
and the claimants in the reparations lawsuits to reach a compromise that would not harm 
trade relations between South Africa and its international counterparts. Despite the court 
cases not getting off to a good start claimants continued to regard government with 
SUsplclon and vowed that they would use every possible legal route to appeal any 
dismissal of the claims (Business Day , 28 August 2003). 
Table 2.1 Chronology of Jubilee actions and state responses 
Date Content Who/what level 
1. 24 June 1998 'Writing off debt has Deputy .. mll1lster of 
consequences' Finance: Gill Marcus -
The Sowetan 
2. 5 November 1998 Jubilee 2000 South Africa: SACC statement 
Founding Declaration 
3. 21 March 1999 Southern African Jubilee Jubilee 2000 South Africa 
Debt Summit. Gauteng 
Declaration: Freedom 
from Debt=Freedom from 
domination 
4. 10 September 1999 Publication of Apartheid Jubilee 2000 South 
Debt: Questions and Africa/AIDC 
answers 
5. 17 September 1999 Intemational campaign to International Jubilee 2000 
collect 100 000 signatures coalition 
by end of 1999 for petition 
to cancel debt 
6. I October 1999 'Supp0l1 debt relief or Mail and Guardian 
drop the renaissance' 
7. 21 July 2000 SACC statement Molefe Tsele: SACC 
General Secretary 
8. July 2000 Cancel the odious, Neville Gabriel - Jubilee 
illegitimate debt SA National Secretary 
9. 24 July 2000 Statement by Jubilee 2000 Neville Gabriel - Jubilee 
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SA on the G7 SA National Secretary 
announcement 
10. 17 June 2002 International legal claim Individual victims of 
apartheid 
1l. 12 November Media statement: Major Jubilee SA and Khulumani 
apartheid reparations suit Support Group 
filed in US court 
12. 25 November 2002 'State distances itself from Business Day 
apartheid lawsuit ' 
13. 27 November 2002 Jubilee SA responds to Jubilee SAlSACBC Justice 
reported comments by and Peace Department 
Cabinet Ministers 
14. 15 April 2003 Statement on the Tabling President Thabo Mbeki 
of the TRC report 
15. 26 July 2003 'Govermnent opposes Independent Online 
reparations claims' 
16. 27-28 August 2003 Civil society conference SACC 
on reparations 
17. 28 August 2003 'Maduna to mediate 111 Business Day 
apartheid lawsuits' 
18. 31 August 2003 'Mbeki 111 bid to avert Independent Online 
reparations litigation' 
19. 1 September 2003 'State steps up its fight Business Day 
against reparation' 
2l. 10 November 2003 'Shaky start for apartheid Business Day 
US lawsuits' 
Sources: www.sacc.org.za, www.sacbc.org.za, www.atdc.co.za, numerous newspaper 
articles 
Analysis of chronology 
The chronology is significant as it shows the number and frequency of interaction 
between government and the Jubilee coalition. As is evident from the above, government 
had initially distanced itself from the debt campaign. Despite countless appeals from 
both the media and civil society for government to become involved in claims for 
reparations, these fell on deaf ears. Government had made it clear that it was not in 
favour of Jubilee's actions but at the same time it vowed not to become embroiled in this 
sensitive issue as discussions about debt and reparations have encouraged countless 
controversial debates. It is interesting to note that when government was finally forced to 
join in negotiations, President Mbeki continued to delegate responsibility to the rest of his 
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staff and it was left to Justice Minister Penuell Maduna to negotiate a compromise with 
the campaigners. 
This response from government has been criticized as wholly inadequate. Government 
initially displayed the same lack of engagement when Jubilee South Africa was started as 
an affiliate of the International Jubilee debt campaign. Its mandate was to address the 
problem of debt cancellation as well as reparations claims made by the victims of 
apartheid. Prior to the fonnation of the South African component of Jubilee there was 
already some indication of government's opinion regarding debt. 
In an article by then Deputy Minister of Finance, Gill Marcus, she outlined government' s 
position and indicated that the state was not in favour of debt cancellation. According to 
a statement released by Jubilee "The Ministry of Finance declared its opposition to 
Jubilee from the outset and launched a media campaign to undennine Jubilee at the time 
of its launch . But, in these early days, government was by and large relatively 
unconcerned about Jubilee" (Dor, 2003). Government's position at this time was 
characterised by inconsistencies and contradictions. In 2000 Thabo Mbeki addressed the 
opening of the South Summit in Havana as the president of the Non-aligned Movement. 
In his speech he promised to address the alleviation of the debt burden and its eventual 
cancellation (Mbeki, 2000). 
The promIse made by Mbeki is contradicted by government's subsequent refusal to 
endorse the Jubilee campaign for the cancellation of debt. Between 1999 and 2002 
government refrained from responding to calls from civil society for the cancellation of 
apartheid debt. Apart from Mbeki's appeals to the world leaders at the 2000 Okinawa 
summit of G8 leaders to adequately address debt and other issues that affect developing 
countries, there has not been much engagement on this matter between his government 
and the Jubilee movement within the country. According to Patrick Bond (2001: 140) 
It is arguab le that Mbeki's approach to ... debt relief has done incalculable 
damage, mainly by virtue of his failure to endorse the Jubilee 2000 South Africa 
campaign against "odious debt" including apartheid debt 
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However, by 2003 the govenunent was "forced" to address debt when Jubilee South 
Africa brought its claims before a foreign court. Government has since then voiced its 
disapproval and objections to the campaigns of Jubilee and instead of support for this 
movement has been opposed to it. These actions have prompted a large amount of 
criticism levelled at government by civil society which has accused the state of being on 
the side of big business at the expense of the poor in South Africa. Real action and 
involvement from government only occurred when it regarded its sovereignty as being 
under attack because of the lawsuits brought before US cOlnis. Prior to Jubilee's decision 
to file the lawsuits against the major overseas corporations that benefited from apartheid, 
government was content to take a backseat and remain detached from the matter. 
However, when it found itself in a situation where its fate rested on a decision made by a 
foreign court, government was compelled to intervene. Despite subsequent attempts by 
the South African government to prevent legal action Jubilee has been adamant that this 
is their last resort and that they would not give in to government pressure. 
An interesting aspect is the low profile kept by President Mbeki. In view of the 
importance of this matter and government's continued appeals to Jubilee about the effects 
that its actions would have on South Africa's economic viability, Mbeki's lack of 
involvement is cause for concern. It is significant that Mbeki has not been more 
involved. In addition there have been few official statements from government with 
regard to Jubilee and little or no consultation between government and civil society. The 
fact that the holder of the country's highest public office has not deemed it necessary to 
be more involved with an issue that addresses the majority of it's citizens, is perhaps 
indicative of where South Africa is currently heading. 
Tone of interactions between government and Jubilee SA 
South Africa has recently celebrated ten years of democracy but the majority of its 
citizens are still faced with large numbers of inequality and poverty with most barely 
feeling the advantages that are said to be trickling down because of GEAR. This has 
created a large amount of disillusionment with government and its abilities to address the 
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needs of those affected by apartheid and who are now being affected by the cuts in social 
spending due to debt servicing thus "paying twice over for apartheid" (SACC, 1998). 
Jubilee's criticisms of government have been very aggressive and forceful. The 
campaign has repeatedly challenged government and has not minced words when 
attacking government's debt repayment policies and its cosying up to big business and 
international finance. Government, on the other hand, has fiercely defended its position. 
Maduna blamed the claimants of displaying a lack of faith in government's abilities to 
provide for its citizens and has been reported as saying that those who have laid the legal 
claim "hope that by waving a magic wand they can do things (that the government 
can't)" (Independent Online, 29 June 2003). This is a clear attack on the Jubilee 
movement. Government has also accused Jubilee of threatening the sovereignty of the 
South African government by appealing to foreign courts. The South African 
government argues that this is a South African dilemma which has to be addressed by 
courts within this country. Jubilee 's unsympathetic retort was that South Africa does not 
possess the legal mechanisms for such litigation as the country has no laws under which a 
case such as this could be heard. Thus Jubilee had no choice but to take their case 
elsewhere (Giyose, interview, 3 October 2004). It was inevitable that the underlying 
problems sUlTounding this issue would empt. Jubilee actions contradict the economic 
policies of the South African government. Whereas the government is intent on fostering 
a relationship that would guarantee foreign direct investment which in turn is meant to 
create jobs and alleviate poverty, the Jubilee movement is ' antagonising' these very 
companies which government is courting. 
Government, on the other hand, should to be more wary when making claims about 
threats to its sovereignty. Firstly, the affidavit submitted by the South African 
government was drafted as a result of consultations between Penuell Maduna and Colin 
Powell in which the latter suggested the submission of an affidavit (Bond, 2003). 
According to M.P Giyose this is ironic as the South African government, in this instance, 
had no problem acquiescing to a request made by the government of another country. 
This could certainly be regarded as a challenge to South Africa's sovereignty as their 
actions were prompted by another sovereign power. M.P Giyose dismissed government's 
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claims by arguing that the very same government that is protesting about its sovereignty 
are the same people who demanded that the rest of the world intervene in South Africa 
and disregard its sovereignty when the National Party government was enforcing 
apartheid. At the time they argued that they were mandated by the people of South 
Africa and that their actions were in the best interests of the country. The Jubilee 
movement is making the same argument namely that they are speaking and acting in the 
interest of the majority of South Africans who are still suffering apartheid's consequences 
(Giyose, intervi ew, 3 October 2004). This suggests the very serious implication that 
government is guilty of hypocrisy and that in this instance it is not acting in the best 
interests of its citizens. 
The tone of nearly all the South African government's replies has been appeasing toward 
the industrialized nations. The agreement between government and business in favour of 
mediation seems to be accompanied by a veiled threat made by business; either make the 
lawsuits disappear or deal with the consequences. Civil society, however, has not been 
completely averse to finding an amicable solution. Many within the Jubilee movement 
are only in favour of legal action as a means to an end and not an end in and of itself. 
Jubilee resorted to legal action after years of campaigning fell on deaf ears and the 
leaders of the world continued to make empty promises. According to a statement by 
Jubil ee South Africa, the legal route was taken after Jubilee became increasingly 
exasperated and frustrated as very little was being done to ease the burden on the poor 
while at the same time millions of people in the developing regions were dying daily due 
to disease and poverty (SACBC, 2000). The tone of Jubilee 's statements suggests that 
they had long since lost patience with government and its reluctance to support the 
Jubilee initiatives. Their statements make no secret about the fact that they are in total 
opposition to government's handling of reparations for apartheid's victims. In spite of 
the fact that government had finally expressed willingness to engage in dialogue, Jubilee 
has not given up its legal campaign. It had been fighting for years to get government and 
business to become involved in order to find a solution that would benefit all 
stakeholders. It is evident from Jubilee's position that it has no faith in government's 
stance. 
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Analysis of the SACC and SACBC's alliance with Jubilee South Africa 
and subsequently government 
Since 2003 there has been a large amount of disagreement regarding the lawsuits and it 
has not come only from government but also within the ranks of Jubilee and has led to 
the apparent withdrawal of the ecumenical movement in South Africa (as mentioned 
earlier, the biggest groups within Jubilee) from the decision making process within 
Jubilee. Molefe Tsele has voiced support for government's aims to stop litigation from 
proceeding. He has accused the litigation process as having become too ' lawyer-driven' 
and in his view, the issue should be handled in South Africa with the participation of 
government and business (Tsele, interview, 29 October 2004). According to Jubilee 
South Africa it was never against mediation and it was not averse to engaging with 
government on this issue. Since its inception it had submitted all relevant reports to 
government and had carried on with this until government stated its objections to the 
lawsuits and began actively opposing the litigation (Giyose, interview, 3 October 2004). 
Two major issues, regarding the SACC and SACBC's relationship with Jubilee, will be 
discussed in this section. First it should be stated that both organizations share the view 
that mediation is the best possible route to finding a solution. The SACBC is in 
agreement with the SACC on the need for churches to engage with political leaders in 
order to find suitable ways to implement the NEPAD plan. This endorsement of NEPAD 
by the two religious bodies was not welcomed by Jubilee supporters8 and was one of the 
major reasons for the divide within Jubilee' s ranks. This was exacerbated by the fact that 
the decision was made without any prior consultation with Jubilee South Africa. In 
response to this M.P. Giyose urged Molefe Tsele to withdraw his statement supporting 
NEPAD. Giyose also suggested that Tsele not allow the SACC to be drawn into a 
situation where it seems to be bound to a particular political ideology (Giyose, interview, 
3 October 2004). There had been a very firm response by the majority of civil society 
organisations within South Africa against the acceptance and implementation of the 
8 In this instance the SACBC and SACC were in agreement about govemment's role. The SACC's 
endorsement ofNEPAD was also accepted by the SACBC. 
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NEPAD document. The SACC, however, hosted a 2003 conference together with the 
World Council of Churches and the All Africa Council of Churches and one of the aims 
of this conference was to understand the motivations behind NEPAD and how it aims to 
"save" Africa. Ironically Dr. Tsele believes that Jubilee themselves have become 
associated with a particular political ideology. According to the SACC general secretary, 
Jubilee has positioned itself as 'the counter movement of the ANC and of Mbeki in 
particular'. In his opinion, this is 'good for the vibrancy of our democracy but it should 
not overshadow attempts to deal with the issue at hand, namely debt reparations' (Tsele, 
interview, 29 October 2004). Thus, according to the SACC, the role of social movements 
should be to campaign for the rights of citizens and to hold government accountable for 
its actions but civi l society should also be able and willing to engage with govemment in 
order to find suitable solutions to issues affecting the country. Despite the fact that the 
SACC was still a member of Jub ilee at this time, the NEPAD issue was not welcomed by 
those within Jubilee and only served to add to the already increasing tension between the 
Executive of Jubi lee and the SACC leadership. 
This also suggested the development of a closer relationship between the Council and 
government. The SACC invited President Thabo Mbeki to explain his renewal plan but 
this invitation was not extended to other civil society actors, a move that would have 
made a large amount of progress in facilitating dialogue between government and civil 
society. The SACC should guard against alienating the rest of civil society. An 
invitation to other civil society actors could have been much more effective particularly 
given the fact that this issue is of considerable importance to Jubilee's campaign. 
The second major Issue between the SACC and Jubilee arose when government 
suggested that it was in favour of mediation and asked that Jubilee withdraw the court 
action. Government has been left with no choice but to involve itself in the Jubi lee 
campaign. The way that it had gone about it however is cause for concern. First, it 
handed an affidavit to US courts instead of consulting with Jubilee. Thereafter, it stated 
that it had managed to enter into a "deal" with business in favour of negotiations and 
mediation. In both these actions it seemed to be acting in its own interests and that of 
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business instead of engaging Jubilee from the outset in order to determine their claims. 
Thus it is hardly surprising that mediation has not taken place. However, the SACC has 
been a big campaigner for mediation between govel11ment, Jubilee and business. The 
ecumenical movement feels that Jubilee should engage govel11ment in discussions as 
more could be gained from talks than would be the case in a court battle. The other 
altel11ative is that the defendants in the court case would either succeed in getting the case 
dismissed by the judge or it would settle out of court. Neither situation would be 
beneficial for either the victims or govel11ment. According to the SACC, it recognises the 
importance of civil society in mobilising itself in order to engage in dialogue with 
govel11ment. The Council does not regard the court cases as being wrong in principle but 
argues that it has not been adequately balanced with the need to find a holistic solution to 
the problems in South Africa (Mahle, interview, 28 September 2004). 
While this is a relevant argument made by the SACC, the actions of its General Secretary 
have not been beneficial to mediation attempts . Molefe Tsele has criticized Jubilee in the 
media by suggesting that they have lost sight of the reasons for the litigation process. 
This tense situation has resulted in many leading figures within the SACC and SACBC 
withdrawing themselves from any further talks and negotiations taking place within 
Jubilee9 (Giyose, interview, 3 October 2004). Though they have not supp0l1ed 
continued court action, they continue to believe in the principles of Jubilee and have not 
completely distanced themselves from the concept of reparations. The SACC's view is 
that civil society should not simply critique govemment from afar but it should also be 
willing to engage in discussions in order to reach compromises that would benefit all. 
Conclusion 
The situation that the SACC finds itself in does not bode well for its abi lity to remain 
neutral and not align itself with govel11ment. While the larger part of civil society 
continues to oppose NEP AD and at the same time fight for reparations, the SACC has 
managed to find itself in between a rock and a hard place with regard to thi s subject. On 
9 Yet, it is very important to note that this does not apply to those SACC members at local and provincial 
levels who are still very involved in the Jubilee campaign (Giyose, interview, 3 October 2004). 
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the one hand, it has tried to work with govemment but on the other hand it should not 
ali enate civi l society. While the SACC is not against the idea of reparations, it seems that 
it has too easily accepted govemment's explanations. If one looks at govemment' s 
actions with regard to the HIV/Aids issue it is easy to be cautious and apprehensive as it 
has repeatedly shown its reluctance to accept constructive criticism and to take heed of 
civil society' s demands. The Council should also be wary of govemment's attempts to 
find a mediated solution to the debt and reparations claims. Mbeki and hi s government 
were perfectly content to take a backseat and not involve themselves with the reparations 
claims. It only expressed its willingness to engage in negotiations when it fe lt threatened. 
Thus the decision by govemment to intervene could be regarded as a decision made in 
the interest of South Africa's economic policies, possibly at the expense of those it claims 
to be helping. 
On the other hand, the SACC's attempts to place itself in between government and civil 
society is a good strategy. By attempting to position itself in the centre of the debate it 
would have been able to liaise with both government and Jubilee. Yet, its relationship 
with the latter appears to have soured considerably and this has been exacerbated by Dr 
Tsele's criticism about the way that the court cases have proceeded. Though it claims 
that as civil society it is still a voice fo r the people, the SACC's tense relationship with 
Jubilee and its willingness to engage in consultation with govemment at the expense of 
other civil society actors, says otherwise. In the interests of its role within civil society 
the SACC should attempt to define its posi tion with greater clarity. Though the counci l 
has its own mandate and is not obliged to consult with other groups on its official stance 
it could be more beneficial, in future, to allow for a certain level of consultation in order 
not to alienate its civil society partners. The SACC's current approach to the debt 
campaign is very similar to its approach to NEPAD. It believes that the debt campaign 
should be under wider political control and that it should not be dealt with by a select 
group in the form of Jubilee. According to Molefe Tsele, the Council believes that by 
engaging the South African govemment instead of isolating and alienating it fi·om 
discussions, more progress wi ll be made. In his view, the lawsuits were only insti tuted as 
a last resort after government's reluctance to engage with Jubilee. Now that govemment 
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has expressed its commitment to finding a resolution that would benefit all, everyone 
concerned should be involved in this process as Jubilee's aims should not be to benefit a 
few but the majority of South Africans, all of whom have suffered under apartheid and 
deserve compensation (Tsele, interview, 29 October 2004). However, this has come at a 
price. The SACC and SACBC have become alienated from their Jubilee allies and a 
large amount of time and energy is spent on this dispute at the expense of the real issue at 
hand. In this instance, the SACC has not been as effective with regard to maintaining the 
middle ground. 
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Chapter 4 
The SACC and SACBC response to government's 
handling of the Zimbabwe crisis 
Introduction 
The current situation in Zimbabwe is characterised hy a breakdown of democracy and the 
lUle of law. When Robert Mugabe became the prime minister of Zimbabwe in 1980, he 
impressed the world with his appeasing attitude towards Zimbabwe's former colonisers. 
In his 1980 election manifesto Mugabe promised that Zanu would take a conciliatory 
position 
Zanu wishes to give the fullest assurance to the white community, the Asian and 
coloured (mixed-race) communities that a Zanu government can never in 
principle or in social or government practice discriminate against them. Racism, 
whether by whites or blacks, is anathema to the humanitarian philosophy of Zanu. 
It is as primitive a dogma as tribalism or regionalism. Zimbabwe cannot just be a 
country of blacks. It is and should remain our country, all of us together (cited in 
Meredith, 2002: 9-10). 
In the first two decades following independence, Zimbabwe was regarded as the darling 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. Aid was rolling in from all over the world and it seemed that 
Zimbabwe would live up to expectations as a post colonial success story. However, this 
period was marred with controversy and claims that Mugabe was responsible for the 
massacre of thousands of Ndebele people because he was intent on eradicating all 
opposition to his lUle. He allegedly began his campaign by waging war against his 
biggest political rival, the Zimbabwe African People's Union led by Joshua Nkomo. 
After many deaths and months of sustained pressure, Nkomo agreed to join forces with 
Zanu PF (Meredith, 2002: 73). However, by the 1990's Mugabe's government was faced 
with two major new challenges. The first was in the form of the war veterans who were 
involved in the fight for freedom and liberation. Despite promises that they would be 
rewarded for the role that they played; they were largely ignored by Mugabe's 
goverrunent. The War Veteran's Fund was set up to provide pensions to fonner 
63 
liberation soldiers but these pensions did not materialise (Meredith, 2002: 134). This 
situation got out of hand in 1997 with the war veterans, rightfully, demanding that they 
be heard. The second issue was the large amount of unresolved tension that existed 
between the government and white farmers despite the government's earlier promises of 
reconciliation. Mugabe's rhetoric was also becoming more and more racist. However, 
he found a way to deal with both these issues in a move that would secure his future as 
ruler of Zimbabwe and rid him of any future opposition. 
He gave war veterans free reign over Zimbabwe and allowed them to take the land back 
by force. Zimbabwe has been on a downward spiral for a number of years and the 
situation is worsened by Mugabe's use of terror and intimidation to quell any resistance 
or criticism of his regime. Despite evidence that this situation has been going on for a 
number of years, it was not until 2000, with the start of he land invasions, that the rest of 
the world stalied taking notice. Robert Mugabe has run Zimbabwe into the ground and 
nobody has been able to do anything about it thus far. He has become even more 
determined to stay in power regardless of the cost to his country as well as the rest of the 
region. Mugabe seems set to join the legion of African dictators like Bokassa, Amin and 
Mobutu who were responsible for the suffering of millions of Africans. 
Though many leaders in both the developed and developing world have denounced and 
criticized Mugabe ' s policies and actions one man is regarded as having the greatest 
capacity to deal with the issue. Thabo Mbeki's policies regarding Zimbabwe have come 
under international, regional and also national criticism and scrutiny. He has been 
criticised for not putting enough pressure on Robert Mugabe. In some instances Mbeki 
has even been accused of propping up the Mugabe regime by providing it with essential 
resources like oil and electricity supplies. Zimbabwe is wholly dependent on these 
resources and more impOliantly so is the existence of the Mugabe govemment. The 
merits and demerits of President Mbeki's foreign policy with regard to Zimbabwe has 
been frequently questioned and analysed. What is apparent however is the fact that 
whatever Mbeki 's current policy, it seems to have done very little to help those in 
Zimbabwe who are the most affected by the instability in the country. 
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In response South African civil society organisations have increasingly shown their 
willingness to engage with Zimbabweans in order to help them find a reasonable solution 
to the turmoil in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe's mounting paranoia has led to the 
implementation of measures that effectively curbs freedom of speech, expression and the 
right to demonstration and he has also sought to curb the influence of civil society. The 
situation is further characterised by the tort lIre of opposition party members, restrictive 
legislation, curtailing of the freedom of the press, attacks on human rights defenders and 
food shortages (Amnesty International, Report 2003). 
This final chapter will look at the role played by the SACC and SACBC in efforts to 
mobilise both the South African government to do more concerning the situation in 
Zimbabwe as well as their efforts to engage in dialogue with their Zimbabwean 
counterparts in order to find an agreeable solution. There are a number of reasons why 
the SACC and SACBC should get involved and are capable of making a difference in 
Zimbabwe. One of the most important ones is the fact that Zimbabwe is currently 
reminiscent of apartheid South Africa. Because of its involvement in the South African 
liberation struggle, the SACC has invaluable experience in mobilising oppressed people 
to stand up to such a regime. Firstly, they can lobby Thabo Mbeki's government into 
taking a more decisive and assertive stance with regard to Zimbabwe. Secondly, they can 
provide much needed guidance and support to their counterparts in Zimbabwe (most 
notably the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Zimbabwe component of the 
Catholic Bishop's Conference). 
SAee response to government 
In the next sections I will provide the following: 
1.1 A content and analysis the content of responses between the SACC and the state 
1.2 A chronology of the interactions between the SACC and the state. 
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Content of responses between the SACC and the state 
In May 2000 an ecumenical task team, represented by the South African Council of 
Churches, the All Africa Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches and ICCO 
Netherlands 10, was sent to Zimbabwe to detennine the true extent of the looming crisis. 
The delegation found a large amount of incriminating evidence against the ruling party. 
According to the popular viewpoint in Zimbabwe "much of the violence was generated 
by ZANU-PF ... " (WCC-Zimbabwe report, 2000). Alanning reports concerning land 
distribution were also found. According to the report "of the falms transferred in the 
resettlement program, some 270 were put in the hands of government and ruling party 
officials or ceded to members of parliament rather than to landless peasants" (WCC-
Zimbabwe report, 2000). In spite of evidence that the corrupt practices of Robert 
Mugabe's government are largely responsible for the chaos, the SADC heads of state 
have chosen to support the Zimbabwe regime. An example of this support for Zimbabwe 
was demonstrated by President Mbeki when he acted on behalf of Zimbabwe in an 
attempt to secure aid from Britain to address the land question (Mbeki, 2000). At the 
time, these and other attempts to provide assistance to Zimbabwe appeared to be very 
noble intentions on the part of Mbeki to help solve the situation and help Zimbabwe out 
of its misery. However, Mugabe has repeatedly reneged on promises and agreements and 
it had become clear that the land question was not the most important issue. Instead 
Robert Mugabe's real agenda was concerned with prolonging his stay in power regardless 
of the effects that this would have on his country. He has, on numerous occasions, 
humiliated Mbeki by disregarding his efforts and ignoring agreements brokered by Mbeki 
on behalf of Zimbabwe. During a trip to Zimbabwe after its 2000 elections President 
Mbeki attempted to convince President Mugabe to change his policies and to return law 
and order to the embattled country. Despite making repeated promises, however, 
Mugabe again went back on his word and left Mbeki shamed and embarrassed (Johnson, 
2001). 
10 ICCO is an organisation whose aim it is to actively work towards the eradication of poverty and injustice 
across the world ICCO is rooted in the Dutch Protestant-Christian tradition and is a regular partner of the 
SACCo 
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Though the 2000 election (which saw Zanu-PF firmly ensconced in another teml in 
office) was characterised by large-scale intimidation the South African govemment 
released a statement that "welcomed the conduct of democratic elections in Zimbabwe". 
It fliliher went on to say "the president (Mbeki) is confident that the ruling party and all 
other parties, will now utilise the mandate received from the people of Zimbabwe to find 
lasting solutions to the pressing socio-economic needs of their people" (Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 2000). This response was reiterated by the SADC heads of state who 
"expressed satisfaction that the elections were held in a transparent, peaceful , free and 
fair environment, in accordance with our shared democratic principles and values" 
(Office of the Presidency, 2000). There were numerous reports by election observers 
which stated the lack of conditions for free and fair elections. As a result, President 
Mbeki's foreign policy came under a large amount of scrutiny when he endorsed the 
Zimbabwe elections. The ecumenical team to Zimbabwe which included the SACC also 
expressed its misgivings about the conditions surrounding the elections in Zimbabwe. 
According to the team report 'the delegation decided to designate WCC observers during 
the election period "intemational ecumenical peace observers". It did so to give an 
indication that it believed the pre-election period was too full of flaws to provide for fully 
free and fair elections' (WCC-Zimbabwe report, 2000). 
South Africa continued to endorse the actions of the Zimbabwe govenunent. Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, South African Minister of Foreign affairs (Sunday Times, 18 February 
2001) resisted calls for South Africa to speak out against the developments in the 
neighbouring country by saying that South Africa would not bow down to pressure 
regarding Zimbabwe 
If you are asking are we going to be combative, we are not. But we will do it in a 
way that builds bridges rather than spoi ls for war. We will not treat the 
Zimbabwe govemment as if it was an illegitimate govemment. It was elected in 
democratic elections that were free and fair. Don't try and push us into a 
combative role (Sunday Times , 18 February 2001) 
She is not the only South African minister to give her backing to the Zimbabwe 
govemment. South Africa's Minister of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana, has visited 
Zimbabwe to foster a "closer working relationship". For those in the country who have 
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to suffer under and endure the tyranny of Mugabe 's reign of terror, this does not suggest 
much reason to hope that South Africa can do anything about their situation (Department 
of Labour, 2003). 
Even the use of sanctions is not considered an option. Sanctions have always been 
regarded as a way to convince a transgressor to refOlID its policies and actions. However, 
when the European Union decided to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe, the South African 
Government released a statement in which it condemned this action and argued that 'the 
people of Zimbabwe need to speak through the ballot box' (Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 2002). Given the problems, which arose during the 2000 elections, the South 
African government was placing far too much faith in an election process that is 
extremely susceptible to intimidation tactics and that lacks the necessary conditions for 
free and fair voting to take place. 
President Mbeki, however, has not been oblivious to the fact that Zimbabwe is in serious 
trouble. An article on the Afrol news network on 5 December 2001, reported that Mbeki 
appeared to be changing his policy of quiet diplomacy in favour of a more direct 
approach. According to the report (AFol News Network, 5 December 200 I) 
Mbeki stressed the need for free and fair elections in the Zimbabwean presidential 
elections scheduled for March next year (2002); said that the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SAD C) needed to intervene urgently and finally said 
its neighbour "misguided economic programme" in the past two decades was 
responsible for the contemporary crisis. 
The president also acknowledged the role (albeit briefly) that the rest of civil society can 
play in helping to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe. On 13 August 2001 President Mbeki 
met with a World Council of Churches delegation and representatives from the SACC to 
discuss the possible role of the ecumenical movement in the resolution of conflicts in the 
SADC region. This was an important move by the president because the SACC enjoys a 
good relationship with the Zimbabwe Council of Churches and can in this way work 
towards a solution that would include the voices of the Zimbabwean people (WCC Press 
Release, 2001). 
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Pres ident Mbeki's position on Zimbabwe, however, is becoming increasingl y reminiscent 
of his stance on HIV/Aids because of the large amount of confusion and disagreement 
that it is causing. South African companies, Sasol and Eskom, have been supplying the 
Mugabe regime with millions of rand worth of oil and electricity on credit. The 
provisions of these resources are of utmost necessity for Mugabe and his cronies to 
remain in power. It seems that all it would take to remove Zanu-PF from government is 
to stop the provision of these resources and to allow sanctions to be imposed. The South 
African government, however, has argued that sanctions would do more harm than good 
to the average Zimbabwean citizen (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2002A) but the 
alternative to this is continued exposure to intimidation and violence and a looming 
famine that will claim thousands of lives. In view of this it is all the more ironic that the 
South African government decided to endorse the 2002 election, calling it the will of the 
people. The government released a statement on 13 March 2002 "welcoming the fact 
that the actual elections and subsequent processes (in Zimbabwe) have proceeded without 
any significant conflict among the participants". According to the statement the South 
African government would continue to "facilitate dialogue between the two main parties" 
(Government conmmnications, 2002). Once more there were conflicting reports 
regarding the elections. The Afrol news network of 13 March 2002 reported that 
All observing sources except the South Africans agree there was lack of 
transparency, political violence and intimidation and the authorities had 
manipulated capacity and opening hours in Harare, hindering thousands of 
opposition supporters from voting (Afro! News Network, 13 March 2002). 
The SACC chose to take a somewhat ambivalent stance on this issue. While it 
recognised the impediments to a free and fair election that existed in Zimbabwe, it 
distanced itself from a pronouncement that the elections were not free and fair. In an 
SACC media release the Council's official position was that 
The conditions which were deliberately created by the incumbent government in 
Zimbabwe, including the harassment and jailing of political opponents, the abuse 
of presidential powers to amend laws, and the government's collusion with the 
police to harass the Opposition, served as an impediment to the creation of free 
and fair elections ... However, it would be incorrect, in our view, to suggest that 
the outcome of the elections were illegitimate. We think they reflect a legitimate 
will of the Zimbabwean voters who turned out in large numbers to express their 
say through the ballot box (SACC, 2002b) 
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The SACC pledged to work together with the ZCC, its sister body in Zimbabwe, in order 
to find solutions to the problem that would be in the best interests of the Zimbabwean 
population as a whole (despite the outcome of the elections and the conditions that 
created it). 
In a similar pledge to continue attempts to address the situation in Zimbabwe, a Sunday 
Times interview with Mbeki on 8 October 2002 reported that the president was 
committed to facilitate in finding solutions to the problems in Zimbabwe by mediating 
talks between all the concerned parties including the commercial farmers (Sunday Tim es, 
8 October 2002). In spite of these assurances, by 2003 Mbeki was once again under the 
spotlight for not dealing adequately with the Zimbabwe issue. In his State of the Nation 
address on 14 February 2003 (The Presidency, 2003) he barely mentioned Zimbabwe 
(which is of much greater concern to South Africa) and chose instead to focus attention 
on the crisis in Iraq. A further uproar was caused by the fact that Mbeki and Nigerian 
President, Olusegun Obsanjo (members of the Commonwealth Troika), were in favour of 
lifting Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth against the wishes of Australian 
Prime Minister, John Howard, the third member of the Commonwealth Troika (Foclls 29, 
March 2003). This has resulted in the view that the Commonwealth is divided along 
racial lines with Mbeki and Obasanjo representing the "black African view" and their 
Australian cOllnterpart, John Howard representing the "white Western view". Mbeki 
seems to have adopted Mugabe 's lise of racial rhetoric to defend his support for 
Zimbabwe. The South African president has accused the "white world" of trying to 
impose its mind set on the African people and ganging up on Africa (Mbeki , 2002). In 
his weekly column on the ANC website, Mbeki undertook to fight against the "upside 
down view of Africa" (Mbeki, 2003). 
The South African government's current approach to Zimbabwe is one which seeks to 
bring all parties together to broker an agreement. Mbeki has tried this tactic before but 
previous negotiation efforts did not include the MDC. Since the beginning of 2004, the 
South African government and Mbeki in particular have experienced renewed criticism 
with regard to their foreign policy towards Zimbabwe. After winning the 2004 elections 
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and a second tenn, Thabo Mbeki promised that he would refocus his attention on 
Zimbabwe (The Zimbabwe Independent, 23 April 2004). Yet, a June deadline set by 
Mbeki after his 2004 election has passed by with no concrete progress being made. The 
SACC too has become more vehement in its calls for more aggressive action from 
government. The Council directed an urgent plea to President Mbeki to send a delegation 
to Zimbabwe to press for ta lks between Zanu and the MDC. According to its statement, 
released on 24 February 2004 "the news that President Mugabe has ruled out the 
possibility of talks taking place is not only wOlTying, but seems to be a grave set back, 
and a loss of opportunity, to nOlmalise the boiling political and economic climate in 
Zimbabwe" (SACC, 2004). 
The SACC expressed support for negotiations and advocated for the use of a forum for 
dialogue in which the views of both the MDC and Zanu PF could be represented. 
According to the General Secretary of the SACC, Molefe Tsele 'The forum, which will 
be quite similar to the South African CODESA ... talks, has been proposed by the 
Zimbabwe Council of Churches,. " which has asked us for our support' (IRIN News, 14 
July 2004). It appears that the SACC is willing to back the same fonn of intervention but 
from a different perspective. The SACC has said that it does not underestimate the role 
of the South African government and its attempts at brokering a peace deal but it should 
not be left up to the government only to find a solution and "regional and continental 
organisations must be seen to be doing something" (Mail and Guardian, 1 March 2004). 
The first attempt by the SACC to host talks between Zanu and the MDC recently ended 
in disappointment when Zanu PF snubbed an invitation to attend a consultation where the 
upcoming elections in Zimbabwe were to be discussed (The Zimbabwe Independent, 8 
October 2004). 
Table 3.1 Chronology of the interactions between the SACC and the 
state 
Date Contents Who/what level 
I. 21-29 May 2000 Report of the ecumenical WCC,SACC,AACC,ICCO 
team visit to Zimbabwe 
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2. 27 June 2000 South African statement South African Department 
on Zimbabwe elections of Foreign Affairs 
declaring them free and 
fair 
3. 7 August 2000 Statement by SADC heads Office of South African 
of state Presidency 
4. 18 February 2001 We won ' t condemn Sunday Times 
Zimbabwe, says Dlamini-
Zuma 
5. 13 August 2001 Thabo Mbeki asks WCC Press Release 
churches to promote 
conflict reso lution in 
Southem Africa 
6. 18 February 2002 Statement on the South African Department 
imposition of targeted of Foreign Affairs 
sanctions on Zimbabwe 
7. 13 March 2002 Statement of the South South African Department 
Africa govemment on the of Foreign Affairs 
elections in Zimbabwe 
8. 8-14 March 2002 ANC Today, Letter from Thabo Mbeki 
the President: Two blacks 
and one white 
9. 3 April 2002 SACC media release on SACC 
Zimbabwe 
10. 8-14 December 2003 ANC Today, Letter from Thabo Mbeki 
the President: We will 
resist the upside down 
view of Africa 
11 . 24 February 2004 SACC asks President SACC 
Mbeki to spark Zimbabwe 
talks 
12. 1 March 2004 Church leaders fom1 Mail and Guardian 
Zimbabwe task team 
13. 14 July 2004 South African churches IRIN News 
urge political parties to 
talk 
Analysis of chronology 
There have been a large number of official announcements and statements on Zimbabwe 
from both the SACC and the South African govel11l11ent. However, they have not been 
directed at each other and as a result the amount of interaction has been inadequate and 
one could even argue, non-existent. If there had been more reciprocal dealings between 
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government and the SACC (as well as the rest of civil society) a solution on how to deal 
with Zimbabwe could have been reached much sooner. Instead government decided that 
it needed to concentrate on maintaining a fragile agreement with Zimbabwe. This had, 
however, failed and instead a situation now exists in which South African civil society 
and govemment are operating entirely separately from one another instead of engaging in 
a mutually beneficial relationship which would be much more effective. 
The problems in Zimbabwe are not a recent phenomenon and have in fact been brewing 
since the early 1990's. However, it was not until 1998 that the world became aware of 
the various human rights abuses and lawlessness that characterizes Zimbabwe today. 
Thabo Mbeki 's government was in favour of a less aggressive approach to the situation 
and introduced a policy of "quiet diplomacy" to address the crisis in Zimbabwe. By the 
time Zimbabwe was preparing for its 2000 elections there were increasing reports that the 
basic elements for a free and fair election to take place in Zimbabwe did not exist. The 
SACC participated in a study together with the World Council of Churches and the All 
Afi"ica Council of Churches to determine the pre-election climate in the country. Though 
the task team described the conditions as unfavourable for free and fair voting, the SACC 
declined from making any statements or pronouncements following the election. The 
South African government, on the other hand, chose to endorse the outcome of the 
voting. During this time the SACC remained silent on Zimbabwe's state of affairs. It 
was only after the 2002 election that the SACC released a statement expressing its 
opinion on the matter. Even then it took a cautious approach stating that although there 
were obstacles to free and fair elections, it cannot dispute that the outcome was not the 
will of the Zimbabwean people (SACC, 2002b). 
Throughout this time the SACC has never criticized government's stance and has instead 
chosen to support government's policy of quiet diplomacy. The Council eventually, 
conceded to the failure of government's policy but suggested that all blame should not be 
attributed to government and that the rest of the civil community should instead work 
together to find a suitable solution that would solve the situation. There has not been 
much interaction between the SACC and government on Zimbabwe. In August 2001 
73 
President Mbeki addressed the churches and asked for their assistance In promoting 
conflict resolution but he has not followed up on this request. Govemment should keep 
in mind that churches possess a number of resources that could playa major role in 
finding a so lution to the crisis. In addition, if the South Afi·ican govem ment utilises its 
resources by working with the civil society movement in this country, it would have 
wider access to those within Zimbabwe and would not only have to deal with this issue at 
the state leveL By liaising with the SACC Thabo Mbeki's govemment could mobilise 
wider grassroots support inside the country and have more success in its deal ings with 
Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF. This has, however, not taken place and there is currently a 
situation where the two groups are pursuing separate plans for dialogue to take place 
instead of pooling together all their resources. 
SACBC response to government 
In the next sections I will provide the following: 
1.1 A content and analysis of the interactions between the SACC and the state 
1.2 A chronology of the interactions between the SACC and the state. 
Content and analysis content of interactions between the 
SACBC and the state 
On the 8th of April 2000 the SACBC issued a press statement condemning the 
lawlessness and violence in Zimbabwe and announced its lack of confidence in the 
govemment 0 f Zimbabwe 
We note with great regret that the political leadership of Zimbabwe has not only 
failed to intervene to restore order, but actually seems to be encouraging the 
lawlessness. President Mugabe appears to have adopted an attitude of 
indifference to the future stability and prosperity ofthe country and people that he 
was elected to serve (SACBC, 2000a). 
Unlike the initial silence by the SACC on this Issue, the SACBC wasted no time in 
publicly denouncing Robert Mugabe 's govemment and the 2000 Zimbabwe election. 
The Bishops also took this opportunity to challenge the South African govemment's 
programme of land redistribution and held up the Zimbabwe case as an example of what 
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problems could occur if the issue of land in South Africa is not adequately addressed. 
The statement furthermore urges Zimbabwe's neighbouring countries (the South African 
government in particular) to take responsibility in trying to resolve this predicament 
(SACBC, 2000a). 
After its April 2000 statement was released, the Catholic Church became 
uncharacteristically quiet on the topic of Zimbabwe. Though it was clear that they were 
major critics of the state of affairs in the country and wanted a return to law and order, 
the SACBC refrained from making any further comments on the situation. This 
prompted an appeal made in the Catholic publication, The Southern Cross, for the 
SACBC to break its silence and engage in more aggressive action in calling on the 
Zimbabwean government to institute reforms. The Southern Cross editorial called on 
"Christians ... to stand with the oppressed and hungry. The Church in South Africa must 
be united in its solidarity with the victims of Mugabe's unjust regime" (The Southern 
Cross Editorial, November 2002). This was an apparent challenge to the SACBC to 
become more involved and engaged in the plight of its Zimbabwean neighbours. The 
Catholic Church's stance on Zimbabwe has, however, not been that simple. According to 
Cardinal Wilfrid Napier, president of the SACBC, the Conference is not in favour of the 
situation in Zimbabwe and is definitely opposed to the ongoing crisis. However, there 
has been a lack of uniformity between the Bishops in Zimbabwe and their South African 
counterparts on how to address the situation (The Southern Cross Editorial, November 
2002) . While bishops from both the ZCBC and the SACBC have made statements in 
their individual capacity, the SACBC decided to abstain from commenting unti l they 
were given the mandate, to intervene, by their Zimbabwean counterpal1s. The ZCBC 
request for assistance came on 7 November 2002 when Bulawayo Archbishop Pius 
Ncube addressed a group of South African Church leaders when he gave the Archbishop 
Denis Hurley lecture in Durban. After giving an overview of the atrocities and major 
human rights abuses that were taking place in Zimbabwe, he appealed to those present 
"to lobby wherever possible to apply pressure on Mugabe and his followers to change" 
(Ncube, 2002). 
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In an attempt to clarify their stance, Church leaders from both Zimbabwe and South 
Africa joined together in a consultation to discuss the role of the church as a peace maker 
in the region. The delegates resolved to meet with church structures in their countries, 
which includes the SACC, the ZCC, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, the 
Evangelical Alliance of South Africa, and the Catholic Bishops Conference in both 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. At the end of the two day conference, on 30 and 31 October 
2002, one of the resolutions agreed upon was the decision for church leaders to meet with 
President Mbeki and convince him of the vital role that should be played by the South 
African government in ending the crisis in Zimbabwe. The delegates also promised to 
remain "committed to the transformations of society ... and as the critical conscience of 
society" (Kubatana Tntst, 2002). 
Following this consultation, there was urgency in the SACBC's efforts to convince the 
South African govemment of the importance of its intervention in Zimbabwe. According 
to a statement released by the SACBC on 6 Febmary 2003 
... the Zimbabwean crisis requires urgent and direct intervention by the South 
African government, in the same way that the government has played a leading 
role in the resolution of other political conflicts on the African continent. There 
are deeply disturbing signs that Zimbabwe is on the brink of total breakdown into 
civil war with massive food and fuel shortages, and increasing levels of organised 
state terror, However, the South African government has consistently snubbed 
calls on it to playa more active role in exposing the abuses that now characterise 
Zimbabwe's political life and to take actions to ave11 a further catastrophe in our 
neighbouring country. (SACBC, 2003a). 
The SACBC, in its statement, demanded that the South African govemment use its 
resources and authority to find a resolution (SACBC, 2003a). Once again, there appeared 
to be a di fference of opinion and a lack of clarity on the official position of the ZCBC on 
how to deal with Mugabe. While Archbishop Ncube was urging South Africa to become 
more aggressive and challenge Mugabe's mle, a rep0l1 was released by the ZCBC 
following the SACBC's 6 Febmary statement in which the Zimbabweans expressed their 
concern about the SACBC 's comments. According to the Zimbabwe Independent some 
members of the ZCBC felt that "confronting President Mugabe could cause trouble and 
possible retribution" (Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2003). The fear expressed by 
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the ZCBC is indicative of how bad the situation has become. In reply to this the ZCBC 
secretary-general Godwin Nyatsanza reportedly said that the SACBC had liaised with the 
ZCBC before it released its statement. According to Neville Gabriel, from the SACBC's 
Justice and Peace Department, said that " ... no bishops ' conference would comment on 
the situation in another bishops ' conference . .. However, the situation in Zimbabwe is a 
very big issue in South Africa and ... the SACBC had to comment on it in relation to our 
own govemment .. .In addition we (the SACBC) have been receiving many requests for 
so lidarity from groups and individuals in Zimbabwe" (Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 
2003). The question of how to approach Robert Mugabe has become a very tense issue. 
What has become clear is that the SACBC is not in favour of the "quiet diplomacy" 
employed by the South African govemment. Its statements have consistently challenged 
the South African govemment to take a more aggressive stance in favour of "quiet 
diplomacy" as the latter is not working. This hesitancy by Mbeki has prompted the 
president of the SACBC, Cardinal Napier, to question why sanctions are not considered 
and applied "intelligently" if it is clear that no other method has worked (News24, 12 July 
2004). President Mbeki has said before that sanctions were not an option because it 
would only worsen the situation in Zimbabwe (Department of foreign affairs, 2002A). 
The problem is that since Mbeki's quiet diplomacy does not seem to bear any fruits, 
perhaps it is time that he considers another route. Napier has argued that the situation in 
Zimbabwe is already so bad that sanctions would hardly make a difference and might 
instead have the desired effect by pressurising President Mugabe (News24, 12 July 2004). 
In an attempt to bring to light the real situation in Zimbabwe, The Solidarity Peace Trust 
conducted a study on Zimbabwe's National Youth Service in September 2003. The 
Peace Trust is an NGO fonned by church leaders in Southem Africa and its aim is to 
promote the ri ghts of those who have suffered human rights abuses in Zimbabwe 
(Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003: 2). The study found concrete evidence to support the 
claim that youth militia camps were being used by Zanu PF to indoctrinate the youth of 
Zimbabwe so that the govemment could use them as a weapon in their fight to stave off 
the opposition and remain in power. According to the church leaders involved in the 
study (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003: 5) 
77 
The national youth service masquerades as a youth training scheme that imparts 
useful skills and patriotic values... The reality is a paramilitary training 
programme for Zimbabwe's youth with the clear aim of inculcating blatantly 
antidemocratic, racist and xenophobic attitudes ... The report details the use of the 
militias by those who control them to carry forward the Zanu PF political agenda 
in everything from manipulating election results to controlling the food 
distribution process to the party's advantage 
The report further argues that Robert Mugabe and his Zanu PF government are fast 
eroding Zimbabwe's legacy as well as its future. It accuses the government of 
"sacrificing the moral, spiritual and physical well-being of a whole generation of 
Zimbabweans for the short term political advantage of those in power, with incalculable 
long-ternl effects upon the very fabric of the nation" (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003: 5). 
The findings of the Trust have been supported by Archbishop Pius Ncube. The 
Independent Catholic News (8 March 2004) reported another appeal made by Ncube that 
the South African government urgently "abandon quiet diplomacy". He urged the 
"international community to assist (Zimbabweans) to force these people ... There is no 
other way of dealing with such a dictator. There must be pressure from a whole lot of 
sides. We can't solve this problem alone" (Independent Catholic News, 8 March 2004). 
On 11 August 2004, the Catholic Church released another statement in which it urged 
"the international community to take stronger action on Zimbabwe and Sudan". 
According to the Bishops "with more than three million people displaced as a result of 
the crisis in Zimbabwe, a generation of exiles and refugees has been created. This 
situation cannot be allowed to continue" (SACBC, 2004). Despite repeated calls by the 
SACBC most of its appeals have not been answered by the South African government. 
There has been no interaction between the SACBC and government on ways to work 
together to find solutions to Zimbabwe's problems. The reason for this could be the 
SACBC's criticism of government's "quiet diplomacy". The bishops have made no 
secret about the fact that they are in favour of a more aggressive stance that might reap 
more rewards. This has not helped the relationships between government and the 
SACBC. The effects of this tension will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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Table 3.2 Chronology of the interactions between the SACBC and the 
state 
Date Content Who/what level 
I. 8 April 2000 Press Statement on crisis SACBC 
in Zimbabwe 
2. November 2002 Southern Cross Editorial SACBC - Cardinal 
Wilfred Napier 
3. 7 November 2002 The Archbishop Denis ZCBC - Archbishop Pius 
Hurley Lecture Ncube 
4. 31 October-2November Roman Catholic Church Bishops from ZCBC and 
2002 Leaders consultation SACBC 
5. 6 February 2003 Establish inquiry into SACBC - Archbishop Buti 
"Green Bomber" or expel Tlagale 
Zimbabwe, Catholic 
Church tell South African 
government 
6. 28 March 2003 Catholics clash over Zim The Zimbabwe 
cnSlS Independent 
7. September 2003 National Youth Service The Solidarity Peace Trust 
Training: Shaping youths 
in a truly Zimbabwean 
manner 
8. 8 March 2004 Pius Ncube calls for Independent Catholic 
support from South News 
African Churches 
9. 12 July 2004 Bishop backs Zirn News 24 
sanctions 
10. 11 August 2004 Catholic Bishops urge the SACBC statement 
intemational community to 
take stronger action on 
Zimbabwe and Sudan 
Analysis of chronology 
As is evident from the above chronology of the SACBC' s statements and actions with 
regard to the Zimbabwe situation, there has not been an extended engagement between 
the South African govemment and the SACBC. It appears that govemment has not 
responded to any demands or appeals made by the SACBC. Instead the two sides have 
acted completely independently from one another in trying to find solutions to 
Zimbabwe's crisis and a way to deal with Robert Mugabe 's dictatorial reign. The 
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SACBC has repeatedly voiced its opInIons through press releases and statements in 
which it has criticized Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' . However, the Bishops' appeals and 
demands have gone unnoticed. Mbeki's defence of his policy has been that he does not 
want to alienate Zimbabwe and that it is a country which needs African solutions instead 
of sanctions, which has generally been the proposed Western solution. Mbeki, in turn, 
has on countless occasions vehemently defended his policies instead of taking heed of the 
suggestions and arguments made by civil society. 
The SACBC experienced a period of relative quiet during 2001 and 2002. The Bishops 
have attributed their silence to elements within the ZCBC that have hindered the South 
Africans from making any statements. The Catholic Church has always spoken with one 
voice and the lack of unity on how to deal with Mugabe had led to a rather disconcerting 
quiet. However, this issue has since been resolved and the SACBC has once again begun 
challenging the slow pace at which negotiations are taking place. 
Thus, judging from the evidence, there has been a major lack of interaction particularly 
from the side of government. The SACBC has made numerous appeals and calls to 
government to review its Zimbabwean forei gn policy which is obviously seriously 
flawed . These demands have fallen on deaf ears and this presents South AfTica with a 
real problem. The crisis could have been dealt with and there could have been more 
progress if the South African government had utilised the wealth of resources that South 
African civil society possesses. Because of its links with other civil society 
organisations, nationally, regionally and internationally the church can be a valuable asset 
with regard to negotiation, mediation and arbitration as it is able to voice the popular 
sentiment. 
Analysis of SACC and SACBC alliances 
Appeals to the South African government, about its handling of the Zimbabwean crisis, 
have come from many other civil society groups. There has even been recent tension 
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between govemment and COSA TV, its partner in the tripartite alliance because of 
COSA TV's promise that it would protest against the Zimbabwe govemment despite 
Thabo Mbeki's quiet diplomacy. According to Zwelinzima Vavi 's article in the Mail and 
Guardian (5 November 2004) 
A diplomatic breakthrough can only happen when Mugabe is forced to change by 
a mass movement from below, by the Zimbabwean people, assisted by a 
campaign of international solidarity action, to compel him to restore human 
rights, repeal repressive laws and allow free and fair elections. This is exactly 
how we defeated the tyranny of Smith and apartheid ... COSA TU will not flinch 
from its intemational duty to organise activity in solidarity with its comrades in 
the ZCTU and the people of Zimbabwe. 
COSATU made it clear that it was no longer going to remain quiet in support ofMbeki's 
quiet diplomacy while its comrades and the people of Zimbabwe continued to suffer. 
The SACC has mainly concentrated on its alliances with its ecumenical partners, the 
WCC, AACC and the ZCC. It is cUlTently assisting the ZCC in the latter's attempts to 
extract an agreement from both the MDC and Zanu that it would patiicipate in a forum to 
debate Zimbabwe's future. The ZCC has proposed a forum which would be like the 
CODESA talks in South Africa and has requested the assistance of the SACC in the 
implementation of this plan. The SACC has decided to back this plan as it has finally 
admitted that "quiet diplomacy and other interventions are ineffective and that the 
encouraging of dialogue between the parties is the most effective way" (JRIN News, 14 
July 2004). 
The SACBC, in tum, has had a similar relationship with its Zimbabwean patiner. 
Though the SACBC has clearly outlined its position with regard to Zimbabwe, it has 
respected the mandate given to it by the ZCBC and has consulted with Zimbabwe 
Catholic Bishops when it has made comments and statements denouncing the Zimbabwe 
dilemma. Like the SACC the SACBC has not, until recently, broadened its relationship 
with other civil society organisations in telms of Zimbabwe. 
The SACC and SACBC recently collaborated with other civil society organisations on a 
two-day conference on 'Minimum Standards for Elections in Zimbabwe'. It organised 
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the conference together with the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), the Institute for 
Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (Idasa) and the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation (IJR). The main aim of the conference was to "determine how the South 
African community can assist Zimbabwe in building a solid consensus on minimum 
election standards" (Zil1l Online, 6 October 2004). This indicates the willingness of civil 
society to work together in finding a way to address the plight of ordinary Zimbabweans 
under the authoritarian rule of Zanu PF. 
Tone of SACC and SACBC interactions 
There appears to be a marked difference between the tone of the statements which were 
released by the SACC and SACBC. Both groups have continuously spoken out about the 
conflict and instability in Zimbabwe. When the SACC participated in an observer task 
team organised by the WCC, the team concluded that the elements for a free and fair 
election did not exist and that the process was hindered by the Mugabe government 
(WCC-Zimbabwe report, 2000). Despite the findings of the WCC task team on the 
situation in Zimbabwe in 2000 (a situation which had not improved by 2002) the SACC 
media release after the 2002 elections made very tentative remarks. Though they agreed 
that the " ... conditions which were deliberately created by the incumbent government on 
Zimbabwe ... served as an impediment to the creation of free and fair elections" the 
Council refrained from making any judgments by suggesting that the "the outcome of the 
elections were legitimate" (SACC, 2002). The SACC was initially very cautious when 
making comments about Zimbabwe and this is evident from the tone of their statements 
which were anything but aggressive or challenging. 
By 2004 the situation had reached major crisis proportions but the SACC had still not 
outrightly criticized the Mbeki government ' s "quiet diplomacy". Instead it suggested that 
the "efforts by President Thabo Mbeki to come up with a peace plan could not be 
underestimated" (Mail and Guardian, I March 2004). The Council of Churches has 
consistently been very diplomatic about its stance on Zimbabwe. In July 2004, the SACC 
reportedly acknowledged that they backed quiet diplomacy in favour of sanctions despite 
quiet diplomacy' s lack of success (Zil1l online, 16 July 2004). An interesting position is 
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that held by SACC youth forum general secretary, Keatlegile Ramatong who claims that 
the church "lacks the spine" to adequately and effectively address the situation. He 
believes that the church is not uti lising its power to influence the decisions made in the 
political arena (Zim online, 16 July 2004). Whether he was talking about the ZCC or the 
SACC, the same holds true for both organisations. They have not uti lised their energy 
sufficiently towards dealing with the crisis. The SACC has shied away from directly 
challenging President Mbeki's fai led quiet diplomacy. 
The SACBC, on the other hand, has challenged Mbeki and his Zimbabwean foreign 
policy head-on . Starting with its first statement on Zimbabwe in 2000, the Bishops 
continued to unreservedly criticize Robert Mugabe's govemment as well as Thabo 
Mbeki's handling of the situation. Their silence between 2001 and 2002 aside, the 
SACBC has been one of Zimbabwe's fiercest cri tics. Their criticism has not only been 
limited to the Zimbabwe gO\'ernment but they have also targeted Mbeki's failed 
approach. After suggesting that Zimbabwe is "on the brink of total breakdown into civil 
war" the Conference condemned the South African government for not playing a more 
active role. It concluded its statement by demanding that "the South African government 
urgently use its influence to facilitate a just and peacefully negotiated settlement of the 
Zimbabwean crisis" (SACBC, 2003a). The SACBC has also blasted Mbeki's decision 
not to implement sanctions. Cardinal Wilfried Napier, President of the SACBC, made a 
jibe at those who were against sanctions suggesting that "they were the ones who stood to 
lose if sanctions were imposed" (News24, 12 July 2004). 
The SACBC has not hesitated to demand that Mbeki change his tactics and that he takes 
more aggressive action in order to convince Mugabe to stop leading Zimbabwe on a 
downward spiral. The Conference has also been extremely critical in their 
announcements regarding the South African government. The same cannot be said for 
the SACC who have opted for a more diplomatic approach intended to be critical of 
govemment but not to become isolated from it. On the one hand, the SACC's approach 
can be seen as one that allows the Council to cosy up to government. This approach, 
however, does have its advantages. The SACC has not alienated goverrunent and thus 
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could engage with it more effectively and with less animosity in the long run. 
Government has shown itself to be very sensitive to critique and the SACBC's aggressive 
stance could sour relations between Mbeki and the Conference in future. At the same 
time, it is necessary to have a group that will not tip toe around government and that 
would demand that it is held accountable for its failures, a task that the SACBC has not 
shied away from. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to determine the extent to which both the SACC and the SACBC 
have lobbied the govemment to playa bigger ro le with regard to resolving the Zimbabwe 
crisis. The matter has led to much debate and has required a large amount of sensitivity 
as the lives of millions of Zimbabwean people are affected by the situation. Given 
Zimbabwe's lack of regard for South Africa's policy of quiet diplomacy, many have 
questioned why Mbeki is not taking a stronger stance. He has often defended his 
approach by arguing that Africa needs to be dealt with in an African way and that the 
West should stop trying to impose their own values onto countries in Africa. However, 
critique against his approach has also come from quarters closer to home. The 
ecumenical movement in the country has repeated ly called for Mbeki to be more 
aggressIve. As it befits members of civil society, they have been very vocal about a 
policy that disregards the rights of Zimbabwean people. Not only does Mbeki's handling 
of the Zimbabwe issue have consequences for the people of that country, but it is also 
proving to have far reaching consequences for South Aflica with regard to economic and 
social instability. South Africans are themselves faced with many social problems 
ranging from poverty to disease while the Mbeki government provides important 
resources to a dictatorial regime that is intent on remaining in power. 
Though they have gone about their critique of the govemment in different ways, both the 
SACC and SACBC have used their important positions within South African civi l society 
to lobby the government to take heed of their demands. One could argue that the SACBC 
has been a more vocal and fierce opponent of the govemment's strategy while the SACC 
has been more subtle in its approach. However, both organisations have been able to join 
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with other civil society organisations like Idasa, the CPS and the IJR in an attempt to find 
an alternative solution to Zimbabwe's problems. COSA TU has also recently voiced its 
discontent with government's approach. This suggests that there could be a much 
stronger and more determined onslaught emanating from civil society. Both the SACC 
and SACBC would do well to join forces with other civil society organisations like 
COSA TU if they intend to force government to meet their demands. This could be an 
extremely successful coalition as it would provide a voice for the most important 
elements in this equation, namely the voices of the people of both Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to detern1ine whether the South African Council of Churches 
has proven itself to be a vibrant member of civil society. Chapter two dealt with South 
Africa's most important crisis to date namely the scourge of HIV/Aids. The South 
African govenunent's handling of this issue and subsequent policies addressing 
HIV / Aids have been extremely controversial and have therefore been questioned and 
challenged not only locally but also within the international community. Government's 
questioning of the link between HIV and Aids as well as its slow implementation of 
effective policies related to the disease has not endeared it to civil society organisations 
within the country. Chapter two attempted to establish whether the SACC, as a member 
of civil society, took government to task over its weak handling of the Aids situation. 
Though not as aggressive as TAC, the Council was, however, intent on joining the fight 
against Aids. As government's HIV/Aids policies became increasingly controversial, the 
SACC, in tum, increased its critique of the state by joining forces with other members of 
civil society. 
80th the SACC and the SAC8C committed themselves to fighting HIV/Aids but the 
Bishops' stance on certain issues relating to the prevention of the disease brought them in 
conflict with government as well as other members of civil society. This has been the 
only difference between the SACBC and the SACC with regard to their stance on Aids 
and for the most part both have been vocal critics of government's Aids policies. The 
biggest and most important consequence to emerge from the government's stance on 
Aids is the commitment and willingness of civil society to join forces and to engage in 
joint action in order to pressurise the state. Evidence suggests that the SACC had initially 
been very concerned with maintaining the middle ground. However, government's 
continuous blunders left the SACC with no choice but to actively oppose its policies and 
seek to force those in power to implement adequate measures to deal with this epidemic. 
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Chapter three looked at South Africa's debt, which has been described by anti-debt 
campaigners as odious and therefore illegitimate. Because the debt was incurred by the 
apartheid goverrunent in order to subj ugate black South Africans, debt campaigners argue 
that it should not be repaid by the ClllTent South African government. South African 
campaigners joined the worldwide Jubilee campaign that argues fo r the eradication of 
debt in Third World nations but they decided that their emphasis would be on the 
cancellation of apar1heid debt. The SACC and SACBC had until recently made up the 
biggest contingent within Jubilee South Africa. The relationship has since soured due to 
the SACC and SACBC's withdrawal from the legal proceedings instituted against foreign 
companies who benefited from apartheid . The two religious bodies have decided to 
support a call from government for all involved to engage in discussions in order to find 
an adequate solution through mediation. Yet, the rest of the Jubilee movement regarded 
this as a betrayal and have vowed to continue the lawsuits. According to those within the 
SACC the legal action was only a way to convince government to change its stance 
regarding debt and it was ultimately a means to an end namely to convince government to 
engage in dialogue. The official view from the SACC was that Jubilee should therefore 
have halted the legal proceedings as soon as govell1ment had acknowledged its campaign 
and agreed to negotiations. 
This issue caused a large amount of tension within Jubilee and both the decision making 
stmctures of the SACC and SACBC subsequently withdrew from the Jubilee movement 
despite a large amount of continued involvement of their members at local and 
community levels. According to the SACC they have not abandoned the debt campaign 
and continue to be in favour of its basic principles. However, the Council argued that 
government should not be excluded from these discussions when it has expressed its 
willingness and commitment to finding a solution that would benefit all. Some may 
argue that govell1ment only agreed to become involved when it appeared that there was 
no other alternative. This is the view of many within Jubilee and it is understandable that 
they di stmst government and its motives . In addition the SACC has been regarded as 
having been co-opted by government and as a result their impar1ial ity was believed to be 
impaired. However, the SACC's choice to support government' s call for mediation is 
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indicative of its policy of critical solidarity. It had critiqued the state when necessary but 
when the latter had shown its willingness to engage in dialogue in order to resolve the 
situation, both the SACC and SACBC professed support for this initiative. 
Chapter four discussed the Zimbabwe crisis, which is mired in much controversy not 
least because of the South African government's disastrous action (some would argue a 
complete lack of action) towards the govenmlent in the neighbouring country. Not only 
has the Zimbabwe government been accused of numerous human rights abuses but some 
have argued that South Africa allowed this to happen by continuing to provide valuable 
resources, essential in prolonging the rule of Zanu PF. The situation in Zimbabwe has 
also led to an influx of refugees into South Africa adding to the already heavy poverty 
burden. Thus the SACC has recently been very critical of the way that the Mbeki 
government has been handling the crisis in Zimbabwe. Though the Council initially 
endorsed Thabo Mbeki's policy of "quiet diplomacy", it has since changed its position 
and has increasingly challenged government to intervene in Zimbabwe. The SACBC, on 
the other hand, have always been critical of "quiet diplomacy" and have been in favour of 
a more aggressive policy that would force the situation to a head. The Bishops have been 
unfailingly critical of govenunent 's position and have condemned the state's lack of 
adequate intervention. 
Both organisations have since taken matters into their own hands by joining together with 
other civil society members in an attempt to foster mediation between the affected parties 
in Zimbabwe. Though there has been very little success due to a lack of commitment on 
the part of Zanu PF, this has been a huge step in the right direction. These members of 
civil society are attempting to fill a vacuum, created by Thabo Mbeki's continued 
insistence on a policy that has proven to be a major failure. By mobilising South African 
civil society and acknowledging the role that it could play much more progress could 
have been made. The South African president failed to acknowledge the importance of 
civil society in this respect. This was best illustrated by the recent failed mission of 
COSATU and the government's subsequent reprimanding of the trade union (Vavi, 
2004). Both the SACC and SACBC have been instmmental in stimulating debate around 
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government's handling of the Zimbabwe crisis and Thabo Mbeki 's "quiet diplomacy". 
The Council certainly altered its criticism or support when the need arose. Though it has 
been careful, in some instances, to not be too critical of govemment it has voiced its 
dissatisfaction and critici sm appropriately. 
In order to further measure the level of civil society involvement of the SACC and the 
SACBC I looked at two definitions (which are discllssed in chapter 1) in order to 
determine whether they apply to these two groups. Thereafter I attempted to situate both 
on a scale from one to ten with one being total conti-ontation and opposition to 
government and ten representing a cosy alliance with the state. The first definition is 
from Gellner (\ 995: 32) who sees civil society as 
" .that set of diverse non-govelllmental institutions, which is strong enough to 
counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its 
role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can 
nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society 
The SACC has continued to be a very influential member of South African society 
because of its historical role. In addition it has access to the large mass of South Africans 
at the grassroots level. Despite possessing a large amount of influence, the SACC might 
be lacking with regard to the possession of adequate resources to counterbalance the 
state. However, by engaging and fonning alliances with other members of civil society 
the Council of Churches can continue to playa significant role in South African civil 
society. The same is true for the SACBC which receives its direction and support from 
the Vatican and as a result possesses a large number ofresources which are important ifit 
wants to carry out its mandate as a civil society character. The Catholic Church speaks 
with one voice and this has in many instances either hampered or strengthened its 
position. Though some of its policies have brought the SACBC in conflict with many of 
its allies including the SACC, this has not stopped it from continuing to challenge 
govelllment on policies that do not have the best interests of the marginalised at heart. 
Civil society has been strengthened by groups like TAC. Some might argue that TAC is 
anti-govelllment and exists primarily to oppose the government. This is however, not 
true. T AC, like many other civil society actors, including the SACC and SACBC has 
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done its best to foster a working relationship with govel1lment in order to find workable 
solutions. What set TAC's approach apart from that of the SACC and SACBC was its 
willingness to institute legal proceedings against government when it continued to drag 
its feet in the implementation of policies to relieve the burden ofHIV/Aids. Despite their 
initial weariness both the SACC and the SACBC supported legal action against 
govel1lment when the need arose. On thei r own, neither organisation has the strength or 
resources to counterbalance the state. However, as a unified force, South African civil 
society possesses a large amount of power and capabilities which are crucial in order to 
hold the state accountable. 
Secondl y, ' civil society and its institutions, which include political parties and vo luntary 
associations, allow for the existence of popular participation and activism which is 
important for democracy to succeed' (Gill, 2000: 7). Both the SACBC and the SACC 
have had to review their role and mission in the ' new' South Africa and this led to a short 
period between 1994 and 1998 in which both religious bodies were redefining their 
positions. The consequence of this period of introspection was that both the SACC and 
the SACBC began to immerse themselves within South African civil society. Despite 
forming a pmi of the SACC, the SACBC also acted within their own capacity as the 
Catholic Church and released statements and press releases condemning govemment 
actions when necessary. In some instances (for example the Zimbabwe dilemma) it even 
directly challenged govemment policies and called for sanctions when govenunent was 
opposed to it. It has taken slightly longer for the SACC to acclimatize itself with regard 
to critiquing govel1lment. Its initial reaction to govemment policies on controversial 
issues was very apprehensive and cautious. However, as these policies proved to be 
ineffectual, the SACC came out in support of civil society actors that have taken 
govemment to task. Both the SACC and SACBC also became more involved with other 
civil society actors like COSATU and TAC and more recently Idasa and the CPS, among 
others. The resultant civil society coalitions that were formed have allowed civil society 
in South Africa to grow and become an important and vital check on govemment. It has 
also allowed for the people of South Africa to make their voices heard and to indirectly 
become involved in the decision making of thi s country. 
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Despite the fact that they might not fit into a completely Western definition of civil 
society, faith based organisations have been crucial in Third World countries which are 
engaged in the democratising process. The SACC acknowledged the fact that despite the 
end of apartheid, it remained an impollant mouthpiece for the people. A large part of the 
Sllccess that this country has experienced as a democracy can be attributed to the vibrant 
and strong civil society network that exists in South Africa. The SACC, in particular, has 
defined its new position as that of a middle man. Together with the rest of civil society 
the SACC's current role is to build a bridge between government and the masses. The 
Council has experienced a few hurdles with regard to its ability to remain neutral but it is 
slowly but surely coming to terms with its civil society character. The conclusion that 
this thesis has reached is that the SACC has managed to live up to its pledge of critical 
solidarity with government and occupies a five on an alliance scale of one to ten 
(mentioned in the introduction) while the SACBC has often been more aggressive and 
critical and for that reason would occupy six on the scale which means that neither 
organisations is in alliance with govenunent or outrightly opposed to it but instead 
occupies the middle ground. In some instances, it could be argued that the Bishops 
Conference was more objective and critical (with regard to goverrunent policies) than the 
COllncil of Churches. The SACBC, however, remains part of the SACC and its 
membership within the SACC will in future allow it to maintain and foster the critical 
component of the Council of Churches especially since the SACC has often veered 
towards government. Though their position has often altered depending on the issue at 
hand, the Council has been inclined to give govemment the benefit of the doubt. This 
position has in turn brought the SACC in conflict with other members of civil society. 
However, the Church in South Africa will continue to have a major role to play within 
civil society as long as it resists attempts by government to engage it in a relationship that 
does not leave the Council any space to remain a critical component of civil society. 
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